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This Essay uses Peter Strauss’s work as a springboard to explore
the particularly precarious position of the agencies charged with
promulgating science-intensive rules (“expert agencies”) with respect to
presidential oversight. Over the last three decades, agencies promul-
gating science-intensive rules have worked to enhance the accountability
and scientific credibility of their rules by developing elaborate procedures
for ensuring both vigorous scientific input and public oversight. They
have accomplished this by deploying multiple rounds of public comment
on their science-policy choices, soliciting rigorous scientific peer review,
inviting dissent, and explaining methods and choices. Yet, at the same
time that these expert agencies work to establish more rigorous decision
processes grounded in both science and public review, the White House,
primarily through its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA), appears to be undermining the agencies’ efforts through its
largely nontransparent oversight process. In a number of rule settings,
OIRA suggests dozens of intricate changes outside of the agencies’
rigorous deliberative processes that, while presumably intended to
advance larger policy preferences, also involve changes to the agencies’
supporting, technical explanations. Even more problematic, most and
sometimes all of these changes are made invisibly, often without leaving
fingerprints and almost always without providing any supporting
explanation or evidence.
While in theory the expert agency and White House review should
make a mutually beneficial team—each bringing important, but
differing, perspectives to bear on science-intensive rules—in practice the
White House’s secretive interventions threaten to undermine the
legitimacy of both institutional processes simultaneously. The end result
is both a weakened expert agency model and a more institutionally
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tenuous presidential review. The Essay concludes with a proposal for
reformed institutional design.
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INTRODUCTION
In a series of articles that are stunningly prescient, Peter Strauss
underscores the challenges involved in locating the place of agencies in
our separation of powers system of government.1 His work illuminates
the importance of treating agencies as separate from the constitutional
branches, while ensuring that they are still subject to meaningful
mechanisms of control. In this way, administrative agencies operate as
the “Fourth Branch,” providing important, deliberatively-based policies
that stand out from the work of the political branches, yet remaining
inferior to them.
Professor Strauss continues this institutional mapping in his more
recent work, paying particular attention to two growing trends in the
administrative state that complicate the placement of agencies in our
separation of powers government. The first is the accelerating number of
technical and scientifically complex social problems that necessitate
significant expertise and technical analysis from agencies.2 The second is
the growing power of the White House, and particularly the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), to oversee the work of the
agencies.3 Each trend presents its own challenges, but when joined
together they pose formidable barriers to institutional design, as each
tends to undermine the legitimacy of the other. In Professor Strauss’s
words, “[t]he development of aggressively centralized presidential over-
1. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, On Capturing the Possible Significance of Institutional
Design and Ethos, Admin. L. Rev. (Special Editio) 259, 268–69 (2009) [hereinafter
Strauss, Institutional Design and Ethos] (“Judicial review of administrative action is front
and center; how a given agency is integrated into government as a whole—and what
constraints or controls might emerge from those relationships—is much less central a
concern.”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 578–80 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, The
Place of Agencies] (noting incongruity of administrative agency function and “rigid
separation-of-powers compartmentalization of governmental functions”).
2. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of
American Rulemaking, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 745, 773–74 (1996) [hereinafter Strauss,
From Expertise to Politics] (distinguishing highly technical and science-intensive rules
from more common-sense rules regulating “berry baskets”); Peter L. Strauss, Possible
Controls over the Bending of Regulatory Science, in Values in Global Administrative Law
125, 126–27 (Gordon Anthony et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Strauss, Possible Controls]
(describing contexts in which agency regulation depends on “sound science”).
3. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Administrative Conference and the Political
Thumb, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 8–9) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (criticizing Administrative Conference for focusing its research
largely at agency level and not at level of Presidential oversight, which may be much more
important influence on agency action); see also Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or
“The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 719
(2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer or Decider] (describing “increasing reach” of
various assertions of presidential control, including OIRA review); Peter L. Strauss,
Presidential Rulemaking, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 965, 967–69 (1997) [hereinafter Strauss,
Presidential Rulemaking] (noting recent Presidents’ increasing interest in particular out-
comes of agency rulemaking).
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sight, even control, of executive agency rulemaking has given . . . new
prominence” to the clash between “technocratic and political views of
agency action.”4
This Essay builds on Professor Strauss’s work at the intersection of
agency expertise and political oversight. Foremost among the many
unresolved institutional puzzles is ensuring the scientific competence of
agencies while at the same time setting up mechanisms to provide for
important sources of political input.5 Since scientific rules are particularly
susceptible to providing cover for backroom deals that can be hidden in
technical terminology,6 establishing processes that protect the agencies’
scientifically based analyses from ends-oriented, political manipulations is
vital to preserve the integrity and value of agency expertise.
Yet despite the critical importance of ensuring the legitimacy of
agency expertise, a growing body of evidence reveals that the White
House may regularly (and surreptitiously) suggest changes to the tech-
nical details of agency analyses.7 This practice of unrestricted and often
unrecorded interventions into the technical minutia of agency rules by
the White House leads to an institutional fork in the road.8 How should
one think about agency expertise if an agency’s intricate science-policy
analysis can be altered in secret by the Chief Executive? Indeed, what is
the role of expert science advisory boards if changes can be made after
their review, at the last minute, by political staff without explanation?9
Either all features of agency decisions, including the underlying scientific
analyses, will be up for grabs in backroom political deliberations, or we
4. Peter L. Strauss, Legislation that Isn’t—Attending to Rulemaking’s “Democracy
Deficit,” 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1351, 1359 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Strauss, From Expertise to Politics, supra note 2, at 774–75 (arguing
“simple notice and comment rulemaking is not adequate” for science-based rules with
large-scale consequences).
6. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
Colum. L. Rev. 1613, 1650–51 (1995) [hereinafter Wagner, Science Charade] (arguing
agencies have “multiple political, legal, and institutional incentives to cloak policy judg-
ments in the garb of science”).
7. See infra section II.B (recounting diverse evidence of OIRA’s engagement in
technical details of agency science-intensive rules).
8. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of
Administrative Law, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1137, 1140–41 (2014) (arguing administrative practice
today departs significantly from view of administrative process embodied in APA and
suggesting reforms are needed to bring two together); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing
“Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127, 1157 (2010)
(making this argument and finding little transparency in OIRA’s suggested policy changes
to agency rules).
9. Even when OIRA’s changes simply reflect the unidentified views of other agency-
experts, as Professor Sunstein maintains, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838, 1840 (2013)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Myths and Realities], the collision is still problematic since this
interagency–White House involvement occurs outside of an agency’s science-intensive
process.
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must find a new institutional equilibrium that ensures a place for agency
experts while forcing agencies to reckon with the larger policy impli-
cations of their rules, including presidential preferences.
With Professor Strauss’s work as a guide, this Essay explores the current
political pressures on agency expertise, with a particular focus on one of the
best-studied agencies, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
offers a preliminary reformed institutional design that finds a distinct place
for agency expertise within the larger political system. Part I of the Essay
details the history of agency-expert decisionmaking. Over the last thirty
years, EPA and a number of other agencies tasked with science-intensive
mandates have become increasingly innovative in developing rigorous
decision processes that make use of the best available scientific research.
Part II provides a similar historical account, this time of the very different
track taken by the President in overseeing executive agencies, such as EPA,
that promulgate science-intensive rules. In this oversight role, some
Presidents regularly tinker with the technical details of the agencies’ rules.
Instead of becoming increasingly formal and transparent like the agency
processes, however, this presidential influence remains informal and
invisible. Part III discusses a series of scientific, legal, and political problems
associated with the current institutional arrangement. In Part IV, Professor
Strauss’s work is used to guide the redesign of the administrative decision-
making process in ways that not only preserve a role for expertise in the
Fourth Branch, but lead to even more vigorous public and expert delib-
erations over science-intensive regulations. EPA again offers a model, this
time through its novel decision process that manages to insulate the
scientific staff at discrete points in the process, while offering more mean-
ingful opportunities for political and policy engagement at other stages.
I. THE AGENCY-AS-EXPERT
Although the hypertechnicality of agency rules is a more recent
phenomenon,10 the basic concept that the agencies should preside over
specialized information is hard-wired into the design of the admin-
istrative state.11 This Part considers the agency-as-expert model as it has
evolved over the last hundred years. Section I.A describes the initial
model from the early 1990s, which operated like a type of insulated “geek
squad.” Section I.B then discusses the current formulation, in which the
agency expert is generally held accountable through a highly proced-
10. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992) (noticing upward trajectory in complexity and
technical detail in Federal Register preambles).
11. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the
Administrative State, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1397, 1406 (2013) (recounting scholarly
consensus that “technical knowledge and experience were relevant to identifying and
understanding the consequences of agency policymaking,” although expertise is not sole
ingredient to agency rulemaking).
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uralized decisionmaking process that includes public and peer review of
the underlying scientific and policy judgments. Part I closes by exploring
ways that this increasingly rigorous approach may become less accessible
to the public and other nonscientists precisely because of its staged,
expert-based decision process.
The types of rules considered here—technical and science-intensive
rules—are effectively interchangeable. For the purposes of this Essay,
technical rules are informed by computational models and/or engineer-
ing expertise from the natural and engineering sciences, while science-
intensive rules are grounded in part on scientific testing and research.
Both types of rules involve significant policy choices at the framing,
analysis, and modeling alternatives stages, but their scientific–technical
details can obscure these choices—by accident and by intention.12
A. A Historical Perspective on the Agency-as-Expert in the United States
The conception of the agency-as-expert is one of the cornerstones of
the U.S. administrative process, but as Professor Strauss notes in his
writings, what that role actually consists of has changed and evolved over
time.13 In the early part of the last century, agencies in the United States
were generally viewed as neutral experts who would resolve the nation’s
complex socio-political challenges.14 This important role of agency-as-
expert coincided with the inherently optimistic belief that there were
“objectively correct solution[s] to the country’s problems.”15 Experts
would come from top universities and other prominent institutions to
serve their country in the quest for empirically verifiable answers.
By the mid-1940s, the culture of deference to agencies began to
change. The publicized inefficiency and incompetence of various New
Deal agencies caused the public and Congress to become increasingly
disenchanted with the “geek squad” model of agency-as-expert, a disil-
lusionment that catalyzed the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act
12. See, e.g., Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 6, at 1618–28 (describing mix of
science and policy in science-intensive rules).
13. See generally Strauss, From Expertise to Politics, supra note 2, at 750–72 (tracing
changes in political and judicial oversight of agencies over time from 1946 to mid-1990s).
14. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One
Hundred Years of American Administrative Law 195–96 (2012) (describing expert agency
overseeing steamboat safety in 1952). See generally Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of
Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106
Mich. L. Rev. 399, 413–18 (2007) [hereinafter Schiller, Era of Deference] (describing
perception of agencies as neutral experts and recounting influential views of Frankfurter
and Landis in believing “government without expertise was a recipe for demagoguery”).
15. Schiller, Era of Deference, supra note 14, at 417; see also H. George Frederickson
et al., The Public Administration Theory Primer 44–45 (2d ed. 2012) (describing
commitment to efficiency and scientific approaches in these early conceptions of admin-
istrative governance).
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(APA).16 In fact, in the APA, not only did Congress mandate notice and
comment of agency rules, it also employed the courts to provide a greater
oversight role in policing the outer bounds of agency discretion.17
Skepticism about the agency-as-expert only grew more intense with the
rise of social regulation in the 1960s and 1970s.18 During that time, Congress
found itself dependent on the agencies to set standards and make hundreds
of micro, technical decisions implementing the new wave of social
legislation. Unfortunately, this increased responsibility coincided with
worries that, in their exercise of technical discretion, some agencies had
been “captured” by the parties that they regulated, raising the possibility
that Congress’s commands were not being carried out to fruition.19
By the end of the twentieth century, the New Deal view of the
agency-as-expert—providing neutral, sociotechnical expertise to resolve
society’s problems—was all but dead, and the agencies’ authoritative role
was in a state of crisis. Two added developments expedited the final
demise of the New Deal agency-as-expert.
First, it became increasingly apparent—through a variety of sources—
that the science-intensive problems faced by federal agencies were even
more policy-laden than initially believed and that, consequently, the
agencies enjoyed substantial policymaking power in selecting the best
alternative from among a wide range of choices.20 In the case of health
protection, this discretionary space was especially significant due to the
large gaps in the relevant scientific literature. As one set of risk analysts put
it, the uncertainties remaining in scientifically determining the precise
level at which exposed humans will experience a one-in-one-million risk of
cancer from drinking Trichloroethylene (TCE)-contaminated tap water
equate to the difference between knowing whether you have enough
16. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, Reining in the Administrative State: World War II and
the Decline of Expert Administration, in Total War and the Law: The American Home
Front in World War II, at 185, 191 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 2002) (describing
this development).
17. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 706(2)(a) (2012) (requiring notice and comment on
informal rulemakings and providing opportunity for judicial review of final agency action).
18. See, e.g., Marc Allen Eisner et al., Contemporary Regulatory Policy 37 (2d ed.
2006) (describing “rapid introduction of social regulation” and “creation of new agencies”
in 1960s and 1970s); Strauss, From Expertise to Politics, supra note 2, at 755–56 (noting
“general social trend that came to view agencies less as apolitical ‘experts’ administering a
strictly rational process, and more as political bodies making choices among alternatives in
response to social needs and political inputs”).
19. See, e.g., Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 Oxford Rev. Econ.
Pol’y 203, 203–04 (2006) (summarizing literature on regulatory capture).
20. See, e.g., Comm. on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants, Nat’l Research
Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment 86 (1994) [hereinafter NRC, Science and
Judgment] (explaining uncertainties result from inability to test key inputs to scientific
models and from gaps in knowledge that make it impossible to know which of several
competing models is correct).
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money to buy a cup of coffee or pay off the national debt;21 consistent with
the wide range of scientific outcomes, the economic implications of alter-
native, plausible drinking water standards are also bound to vary
dramatically.
Second and relatedly, the agencies came under fierce attack,
particularly by regulated parties who faced expensive health and environ-
mental regulation as the agencies’ policymaking discretion became
evident. Among the tactics of the industry’s opposition were the allegations
that these runaway agencies were using bad science and were anything but
competent experts.22 Indeed, the fuzzy line between science and policy
made it even easier to allege agency misconduct. Those opposing a regu-
lation merely had to point out ways in which an agency’s decision deviated
from some other scientifically respectable outcome without acknowledging
that the difference between the two results was based on different policy
assumptions and not on differences in scientific judgment.23
B. The Agency-as-Expert Revisited
In response to the growing democratic challenges afflicting the
administrative state, agencies found themselves on the defensive with
their authoritative role as experts hanging in the balance. Rather than
surrender, the agencies—with reinforcement from Congress, the courts,
and the President—developed a new image that retained their primacy
as the nation’s experts. The model that emerged from this effort is
explored in the following subsection.
1. The Twenty-First Century Model of the Agency-as-Expert. — The twenty-
first century agency-as-expert abandons any pretense of the New Dealer’s
insulated, neutral expert, and instead it is distinguished by a highly
proceduralized approach to decisionmaking, reinforced by a profes-
sionalized civil service.24 In this way, multiple, overlapping public and
21. See C. Richard Cothern et al., Estimating Risk to Human Health, 20 Envtl. Sci. &
Tech. 111, 115 (1986) (providing examples of significant uncertainties embedded in
typical risk assessments of toxic substances).
22. See, e.g., David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Manufacturing Uncertainty:
Contested Science and the Protection of the Public’s Health and Environment, 95 Am. J. Pub.
Health S39, S41–43 (2005) (providing examples of industry’s strategy of contesting quality of
agency science to undermine and delay agency protective regulations); Chris Mooney, Beware
‘Sound Science.’ It’s Doublespeak for Trouble, Wash. Post (Feb. 29, 2004), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2004/02/29/beware-sound-science-its-doublespeak-
for-trouble/8e4aaeed-f918-4cc1-8508-3e38b3cfb613/ [http://perma.cc/NR5M-7V6T] (same).
23. See, e.g., Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, “Regulatory Daubert”: A Proposal to
Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert Principles into
Administrative Law, Law and Contemp. Probs., Autumn 2003, at 7, 9–13, 19–20 (attempting to
pinpoint problems with quality of agency science by providing scattered examples that tend to
fall squarely on science-policy line).
24. See, e.g., Rena Steinzor & Sidney Shapiro, The People’s Agents and the Battle to
Protect the American Public: Special Interests, Government, and Threats to Health, Safety, and
the Environment 197–99 (2010) (emphasizing importance of staffing competent agencies with
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scientific processes constrain the agencies’ discretion and improve the
rigor and transparency of their decisions and underlying analyses. The
heightened transparency of this process also enhances agency
accountability and legitimacy. In fact, this deliberative approach to
agency expertise finds roots in the philosophy of science, where a
founding precept is that all science should be subject to rigorous
questioning and constant, skeptical double-checking.25
There are several procedural innovations in particular that charac-
terize the contemporary model of the agency-as-expert in the United
States. First and foremost, many agencies have instituted formal and
often extensive expert peer review processes to solicit feedback on their
science-intensive analyses.26 Sometimes coaxed by the White House27 or
professionals dedicated to public service and arguing “professional credentials” of agency
political appointees have “steadily improved”); Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy
Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy,
47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 463, 489–91 (2012) (describing combined discursive and expert features
of administrative expertise as fitting within larger, “inside-out” model of professional
administration). The procedures used in science-intensive rules are itemized in a recent ACUS
report on agency integration of science. See Wendy Wagner, Science in Regulation: A Study of
Agency Decisionmaking Approaches 29–75 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files
/documents/Science%20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf [http://perma.cc
/79KH-K5Z3] [hereinafter Wagner, ACUS Report] (examining EPA, Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s integration of science in several distinct
regulatory programs).
25. See, e.g., Helen E. Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in
Scientific Inquiry 80 (1990) (underscoring role of critical and diverse scrutiny in science).
26. See, e.g., Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 113–15 (discussing prevalence of
peer review in multiple agency processes while acknowledging some imperfections in agency
records with respect to making use of expert peer review). The important role of peer review in
agencies’ science-intensive rules has been a continuing theme in the reform literature. See, e.g.,
Bipartisan Policy Ctr., Improving the Use of Science in Regulatory Policy 17 (2009),
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/BPC%20Science%20
Report%20fnl.pdf [http://perma.cc/V8P7-B3L6] (recommending peer review be performed
“to the maximum extent possible”). See generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of
Regulatory Peer Review, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2006) (arguing regulatory peer review is
important to show “where an agency’s use of science in support of a proposed decision ends
and where its use of professional judgment and normative policy choices begins”).
27. See Presidential Memorandum on Scientific Integrity, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,671, 10,671
(Mar. 11, 2009) (directing agencies to employ high scientific standard in their work);
Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, on Issuance of OMB’s
“Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review” to Heads of Dep’ts & Agencies 2–3 (Dec.
16, 2004), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05
03.pdf [http://perma.cc/2J5S-L8JG] (requiring peer review for agencies’ significant scientific
analyses); Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Dir., Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, on Scientific
Integrity, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies 1–2 (Dec. 17, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/scientific-integrity-memo-12172010.pdf [http://perma.cc/B
6T9-HCEU] [hereinafter Holdren Memorandum] (requiring agencies to develop policies to
ensure “data and research used to support policy decisions undergo independent peer review by
qualified experts, where feasible and appropriate, and consistent with law”).
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Congress28 and sometimes of their own volition,29 the last four decades
have seen agencies subject their decisions not only to formal layers of
internal staff peer review, but to external-peer review as well.
Second, in this newly proceduralized agency-as-expert model, judi-
cial review has emerged as an important disciplining force. Courts
require agencies to provide clear and well-supported explanations for
their intertwined scientific and policy choices.30 Thus, much like expert
peer review, the courts scrutinize agency decisions—both technical and
political—and demand that agencies explain their analysis at each step
along the process.31
Third and most recently, at least a few agencies have developed
highly structured analytical processes designed to ensure that both the
final decisions, and each stage in the process that leads up to them, are
transparent and subject to expert and public scrutiny.32 While none of
these analytical steps typically involve only science or only policy, by
explaining the choices at each step in the process—how the agency
articulated the problem, evaluated the literature, applied the literature
to the problem at hand with models, and identified the range of
options—the messy merging of science and policy has become more
transparent and more accessible.33
2. Institutional Recognition of the Twenty-First Century Model of the Agency-
as-Expert. — Just as science is defined by virtue of its process, expert
regulation is now characterized by its adherence to a decisionmaking
process that seeks both the best science and the best policy through
multiple explication and oversight requirements. Transparency, peer and
28. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) (2012) (requiring peer review of EPA’s NAAQS
reviews under Clean Air Act).
29. The FWS, for example, voluntarily solicits individual peer review of its proposed listing
of endangered and threatened species. See, e.g., Joy Nicholopoulos, The Endangered Species
Listing Program, 24 Endangered Species Bull. 6 (1999), reprinted in Endangered Species
Update, July/Aug. 2000, at S6, S9 (describing process FWS uses to solicit and engage external
peer review of its listing rules).
30. See generally infra notes 183–187 and accompanying text (discussing this ap-
proach to judicial review). See also Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA:
From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51, 54, 63–64 (observing role of courts when
politics interfere with decisions requiring agency scientific expertise); Emily Hammond
Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of
Agency Science, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 733, 738, 778–79 (2011) (extolling benefits of
judiciary’s insistence on reason-giving as applied to agencies’ science-intensive rules).
31. See infra notes 183–184 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ approaches to
reviewing scientific challenges to agency rules).
32. The National Academies endorse this approach. See NRC, Science and
Judgment, supra note 20, at 144, 186–87, 254–55, 257–58 (emphasizing need for
structured steps in other types of science-intensive assessments conducted by EPA and
providing series of steps roughly paralleling NAAQS steps).
33. See, e.g., Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 119–24 (describing EPA’s four
analytical stages in its decision process for setting ambient air quality standards and referencing
other, implicit and explicit, agency and institutional endorsements of these steps).
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public scrutiny, and more structured analysis processes are the hallmarks of
the agency-as-expert in the United States today and appear to have helped
agencies retain their authoritative role as the nation’s experts.
At least in the abstract, each branch of government recognizes and
reinforces this revitalized model of the agency-as-expert. The courts, for
example, defer to the agency-as-expert, particularly when the agency
explains its underlying methods and assumptions.34 Congress similarly
conditions its recognition of the agency-as-expert on the agencies’ fidelity
to a proceduralized and transparent decisionmaking process. Indeed,
over the last few decades, Congress has imposed increasingly elaborate
requirements on agencies in a number of areas.35
Of all the branches of government, however, the President and the
offices in the White House have been the most forthright in endorsing
this agency-as-expert model, including the heightened transparency and
rigorous deliberation and peer scrutiny that it entails. The most recent
invocation came from President Barack Obama in his scientific integrity
initiative issued early in his first term.36 In the President’s own words, “To
the extent permitted by law, there should be transparency in the
preparation, identification, and use of scientific and technological infor-
mation in policymaking.”37 Other reinforcing executive directives came
from OIRA in the form of peer-review, cost-benefit, and risk-assessment
guidelines, each of which seek to improve the quality of the agencies’
expertise.38
But it is not only the positive endorsements of the revitalized agency-
as-expert model that underscore its central role in the administrative
state; negative events also shape the way the public and the government
view the agency in its role as expert. For example, there is outrage—and
a rash of bipartisan approbation—when it is leaked that the White House
is editing documents summarizing the science of climate change.39 When
34. See generally infra notes 183–187 and accompanying text (recounting courts’
approaches to reviewing agency science-intensive rules).
35. See infra notes 169–171 and accompanying text (describing increased require-
ments for data quality, transparency, and peer review).
36. See Presidential Memorandum on Scientific Integrity, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,671, 10,671
(Mar. 11, 2009) (calling for procedures and methods to enhance integrity of agency science-
intensive policies); see also Holdren Memorandum, supra note 27, at 1 (setting forth more
specific procedures to enhance scientific integrity of agency rules following President’s
memo).
37. Presidential Memorandum on Scientific Integrity, 74 Fed. Reg. at10,67. Shortly after
taking office, President Barack Obama observed, “we have watched as scientific integrity has
been undermined and scientific research politicized in an effort to advance predetermined id-
eological agendas.” President Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Academy of Sciences
(Apr. 27, 2009), http://news.sciencemag.org/2009/04/obama-academy-iv-speech-text [http://
perma.cc/S95F-NKKF].
38. See infra section II.B.1 (discussing these guidelines).
39. See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Aide Softened Greenhouse Gas Links to Global
Warming, N.Y. Times (June 8, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/08/politics
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political appointees direct scientific staff on what they “should” find in
their analysis of the survival needs of endangered species, the roof blows
off the agency and there are full-scale internal and congressional
investigations.40 Generally, the “stacking” of scientific advisory boards by
political appointees is considered an illegitimate tactic and is so harshly
sanctioned by the media that it occurs only a few times every decade.41
When agency experts are hushed, gagged, or not allowed to publish their
work, there is an uproar that leads to systemic changes in agency
processes.42 In a number of oversight hearings and requests for review by
the National Academy of Sciences, agency administrators have been
questioned on their analysis of the scientific evidence.43 And through
these grueling hearings, the important role that the agency-as-expert
plays in guarding health, the environment, and other areas of govern-
ment oversight remains unmistakable. As one House Chairman com-
plained in his introductory remarks, “[c]learly, the EPA is too busy
expanding its own powers to slow down long enough to listen to its own
scientists.”44
3. The Place for Politics in Science-Intensive Rules. — The rigorous
analytical process developed by the agencies as a result of these political
pressures improves the scientific competence of agency decisions, but it
also presents the countervailing risk that that the larger policy impli-
cations of the agencies’ decisions may become overshadowed by tech-
/bush-aide-softened-greenhouse-gas-links-to-global-warming.html?_r=0 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing critical reactions of climate experts after White House
official, Phil Cooney, edited climate change report summarizing science).
40. See, e.g., Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Investigative Report:
The Endangered Species Act and the Conflict between Science and Policy 1–8 (2008)
[hereinafter Report, Endangered Species Act] (discussing Julie MacDonald scandal).
41. See, e.g., Robert Steinbrook, Science, Politics, and the Federal Advisory
Committees, 350 New Eng. J. Med. 1454, 1456 (2004) (criticizing Bush II Administration
for stacking science advisory committees and suggesting strategy is uncommon historically
because of its political unpopularity).
42. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental
Policy, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1601, 1603–17 (2008) [hereinafter Doremus, Scientific and Political
Integrity] (detailing news events involving manipulation of science in agencies by Bush II
Administration).
43. See, e.g., Examining the Science of EPA Overreach: A Case Study in Texas: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., 113th Cong. 7, 109 (2014) [hereinafter
Hearing, Science of EPA Overreach] (hearing several state regulators charge EPA with over-
regulation in Texas based on limited to no scientific evidence); EPA’s IRIS Program: Evaluating
the Science and Process Behind Chemical Risk Assessment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Investigations & Oversight of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 112th Cong. 59–60 (2011)
(criticizing EPA for not moving quickly to adopt NAS recommendations to improve scientific
integrity of chemical assessments); Committee Investigation into EPA’s Secret Science, House
Comm. on Sci., Space & Tech., https://science.house.gov/issues/committee-investigation-epas-
secret-science [https://perma.cc/PS2D-YM4V] (last visited Aug. 9, 2015) (charging EPA with
failure to make data underlying clean air rules accessible to members of Congress and public).
44. Hearing, Science of EPA Overreach, supra note 43, at 7 (statement of Rep. Smith,
Chairman, H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech.).
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nical minutia. Indeed, some agency analyses may become so com-
partmentalized and complicated that it is difficult to extract or articulate
the underlying choices that form the basis for the analyses.45 The
resulting complication can impede participation by many important
affected parties, including the President.
Even if the agency highlights some of the policy implications of
alternative scenarios at the end of the process, decisions made early in the
process about how to construct the problem or the policy goals can be just
as consequential, but remain obscure. For example, the initial framing of
the project, such as the selection of what constitutes a susceptible
individual or what particular harms will be evaluated, can be buried in
tedious and often lengthy discussions of the agency’s consideration of
competing quantitative models that take these key choices for granted.46
Indeed, the National Academies berated the agencies, particularly EPA, for
precisely this shortcoming in a series of reports, with the most recent
published in 2011.47
As agencies become more hostile to executive oversight, the risk that
underlying policy choices will be lost in a mountain of analytical detail
appears still more inevitable. Jennifer Nou identifies a range of tech-
niques that enable agencies to increase the costs to OIRA of reviewing
agency rules in cases when the agency perceives risks (e.g., reversal) from
presidential review.48 She hypothesizes that “the more an agency invests
in . . . research, the more costly it becomes for the President to contest
the agency’s decision. Competing expertise from experts within the
executive branch would now be necessary in order to engage the agency
on its terms.”49 Agencies can also insulate themselves from unwanted
review by using “jargon” and obfuscating assumptions in ways that make
it more difficult for non-experts, like the President, to understand their
analysis.50
45. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information
Capture, 59 Duke L.J. 1321, 1343–51 (2010) (providing example in EPA context and
citing to literature describing broader phenomenon).
46. See generally Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher & Pasky Pascual, Misunderstanding
Models in Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 293, 336–45
(2010) (providing examples of strategic use of models in regulation to advance
predetermined ends surreptitiously).
47. See Nat’l Research Council, Review of the Environmental Protection Agency’s
Draft IRIS Assessment of Formaldehyde 26 (2011) (finding EPA’s assessments were “not
prepared in a transparent, consistent fashion” with regard to methodology and criteria).
48. See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 Harv. L.
Rev. 1755, 1771 (2013) (discussing why agencies may want to avoid presidential oversight
and exploring how agencies can insulate themselves from these interventions).
49. Id. at 1793.
50. See id. (“[A]gencies can choose to initially submit an economically significant
rule accompanied by a poorly translated [cost-benefit analysis (CBA)], which requires
higher reviewing costs, or a well-translated CBA, which requires less.”).
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These mutually reinforcing benefits of producing rules that are
approached as technical exercises—particularly the increased author-
itative role coupled with greater opacity of regulatory products to institu-
tional overseers—operate synergistically to discourage agencies from
being frank about their underlying policy choices. As a result, an agency-
as-expert will be inclined to err on the side of the technical merely as a
matter of political survival. From the perspective of the agency, it is
competent scientific choices rather than bold political policies that will
sustain them in the politically difficult times.
II. WHITE HOUSE REVIEW OF SCIENCE-INTENSIVE RULES
The possibility that agencies might lose sight of the social
implications of their decisions as a result of their fastidious technical
analyses—or, to use the colloquialism, the “forest will be lost for the
trees”—provides the raison d’être for White House review. The White
House is ideally positioned to refocus the agencies’ sight lines from these
analytic details to the larger policy implications that emerge from their
rules.51 Indeed, the presidential creation of OIRA review was established
in large part to advance this goal.52
President Ronald Reagan was particularly concerned about ensuring
that his political priorities were reflected in the large number of
individual agency rules, or at least the most significant ones, leading him
to establish the concept of a White House review process.53 President
Reagan’s bold Executive Order tasked a small agency within the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB)—OIRA—with the responsibility for
ensuring both that agencies prepared cost-benefit analyses on significant
rules and that the agencies’ most significant rules were “cleared”
through the White House before being made public.54
The resulting institutional architecture, however, not only positions
the White House, through OIRA, as a gatekeeper focused on making
sure presidential policy is appropriately reflected in agency rules, but also
empowers OIRA to serve as a presidential command center with few
51. See, e.g., Strauss, The Place of Agencies, supra note 1, at 662–66 (arguing
President can provide unique balance and uniformity to agency outcomes).
52. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 533, 557 (1989) [hereinafter Bruff, Presidential Management] (“The goals
of review in OIRA are based upon a recognition that, like any other outside review,
executive oversight can make regulation more reasoned by forcing articulation of the basis
of proposals.”).
53. For an excellent overview of President Reagan’s role in developing OIRA review,
see id. at 549–52.
54. See generally Nou, supra note 48, at 1767–70 (discussing history of OIRA review);
Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory
Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, Admin. L. Rev., (Special Edition) 37, 63–64 (2011)
(discussing Executive Order’s “[d]esignation of OIRA employees as desk officers with the
responsibility to oversee the regulatory actions of each agency”).
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limits on the issues it can address.55 In fact, as the following section
explains, in the actual implementation of this institutional blueprint, the
White House becomes ineluctably drawn into the technical details of
agency rules. Limiting political branches to “just the policy,” is not as
simple as it sounds. Section II.A examines both the justification given for
and risks associated with White House review of agency science-intensive
and technical rules. Section II.B goes on to discuss the relatively elab-
orate role of the White House and OIRA in overseeing agency rules and
policies at a general level, and recounts evidence from diverse sources
regarding the penetration of this oversight into the technical details of
science-intensive rules.
A. The Logistics of White House Review of Agency Science-Intensive Rules
Before examining how OIRA reviews science-intensive and technical
rules, it is first worth briefly considering in more detail the underlying
justification for White House review itself. Given the fact that regulatory
programs—both scientific and nontechnical—are usually delegated to
agencies, does the White House have any role to play in the development
of these rules, including technical rules? In the abstract, the answer is
yes—the White House can be a valuable and legitimate participant in
informing policy choices underlying agency rules.56 The President, for
example, may advocate for policies that emerge from his or her own
electoral commitments and goals, whether these goals are to decrease
the costs of regulation or advance public health protection.57 As head of
the executive branch, the President may also focus on minimizing the
risks associated with agency inefficiency and incompetence. Additionally,
the President may find it necessary to referee between agency policies
that ideally should be reconciled, either to be consistent with the
presidential policy agenda or simply as a matter of regulatory coherence
or efficacy.58 While the legitimacy of any specific intervention must be
55. While the ultimate decision technically resides with the agency, a number of
commentators have noted the multiple reasons that agencies are likely to comply with
OIRA’s suggestions. See infra note 122 (identifying multiple sources of OIRA influence
over agencies, including clearing their budget requests to Congress). See generally Bruff,
Presidential Management, supra note 52, at 559–62 (describing OIRA’s power over
agencies).
56. See generally Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise,
12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 461, 461 (2010) (arguing judgments underlying new regulations
reflect policy choices that need support from political officers).
57. But see Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty,
Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 357, 360 (2010)
(criticizing many generalizations regarding President’s ability to advance electoral
preferences in specific regulations as completely unrealistic). See generally Sunstein,
Myths and Realities, supra note 9, at 1869–74 (outlining various benefits of OIRA review).
58. Farina, supra note 57, at 372–73 (describing advantages of unitary Executive); see
also Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 68–69 (2006)
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judged on a case-specific basis, for the purposes of this Essay, it is
assumed that at least some White House engagement is not only
appropriate but also desirable.
Yet the fact that the White House has a legitimate role to play in the
macro-policies of even the most scientifically intricate agency rules does
not give it or its primary oversight agency, OIRA, carte blanche to review
all facets of agency rules without limit. Most obviously, because OIRA is
not a scientific agency and has limited scientific staff (at last count, it had
two scientists on staff),59 there is a risk that OIRA’s suggestions may lack
an adequate grounding in science. Perhaps even more importantly,
OIRA’s changes are not subjected to external (or perhaps internal)
scientific oversight.60 Unlike the agencies that implement a “science-like”
process and subject their analyses to multiple opportunities for peer
review and public review,61 OIRA’s changes emerge more informally and
often at the eleventh hour, typically occurring after the agencies’ peer
and public review have concluded.62
Additionally and from an institutional perspective, the unfortunate
truth of the matter is that precisely because these science-intensive and
technical rules are often complicated and difficult to understand, they
are particularly susceptible to ends-oriented manipulation without detec-
tion.63 As such, agency technical rules can offer a particularly convenient
way for the White House to advance some more controversial policies
(noting numerous agencies use OIRA as vehicle for suggesting changes to other agency
rules and as many as nineteen White House offices have gotten involved in single
rulemakings during Bush I Administration); Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of
Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443, 447–49 (1987) [hereinafter
McGarity, Presidential Control] (discussing benefits of presidential control in promoting
internal executive branch coherence); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized
White House Regulatory Review, 1 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 209, 263–64 (2012)
(discussing OIRA’s role in collecting interagency comments and providing suggestions to
agency based on interagency input).
59. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and the Politicization of Risk Assessment,
37 Envtl. L. 1083, 1094 (2007) (noting small size of OIRA’s staff, even during high point of
its staffing efforts). Professor Sunstein also reported that OIRA “generally had two
scientists on its staff” during his 2009 to 2012 tenure. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra
note 9, at 1871.
60. Cf. Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the
Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 Pace Envtl. L. Rev.
325, 361–65 (2014) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Inside EPA] (discussing nontransparent
nature of OIRA review); Mendelson, supra note 8, at 1149–51 (“Despite the directives and
the executive order disclosure requirements . . . public information about the content of
executive supervision of an agency decision itself . . . is surprisingly rare.”).
61. See Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 75–91 (describing relatively rigorous
processes EPA, FWS, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission use to integrate science into
regulatory decisions).
62. See infra section II.B.2 (recounting evidence of OIRA engagement in technical
details of agency science-intensive rules).
63. Cf. McGarity, Presidential Control, supra note 58, at 454–56 (discussing White
House incentives for opacity with respect to its interventions).
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without incurring the risks of adverse publicity.64 Even when a political
motive has not yet crystalized, the fact that science-intensive rules involve
significant policy choices and that OIRA’s changes to these rules are
likely to go unnoticed creates a magnetic field of sorts that draws OIRA
to these rules, a force made all the more powerful by the lack of limits
and transparency on its contributions.
As a result of the overlapping risks associated with OIRA’s review of
technical and science-intensive rules, academic proponents have long
stressed the need for heightened transparency or even complete
abstinence in OIRA’s review of science-intensive rules.65 As early as 1980,
for example, ACUS issued a recommendation that while policy issues
were appropriate for White House engagement, the White House must
provide documentation of any intervention in the scientific or factual
features of the agencies’ rules.66
Justice Elena Kagan, a widely cited proponent of White House
review, advocates for even more self-restraint in OIRA’s review of
technical and science-intensive rules.67 More specifically, Justice Kagan
expresses concern that the exercise of presidential power in agencies’
science-intensive rules “would threaten a kind of impartiality and
objectivity in decisionmaking that conduces to both the effectiveness and
the legitimacy of the administrative process.”68 This is particularly true,
she points out, in determinations that involve input from congressionally
required science advisory panels.69 As a result, Justice Kagan concludes
64. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 8, at 1163 (observing, in general, “keeping a low
profile for presidential influence also allows more successful presidential pressure that is
the result of presidential capture”). Sidney Shapiro makes a parallel argument in his
critique of OIRA’s risk assessment guidelines. See Shapiro, supra note 59, at 1095–103
(arguing OMB’s nontransparent interventions into agency rules were product of weak
science and strong political motives).
65. See infra notes 124–126 and accompanying text (highlighting recommendations
for OIRA to tread carefully, if not refrain entirely, when reviewing agency scientific
determinations).
66. See Intragovernmental Communications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings
(Recommendation No. 80-6), 45 Fed. Reg. 86,407, 86,408 (Dec. 31, 1980) (showing ACUS
recommendation that interagency communications related to factual matters—as opposed
to policy—be publicly disclosed); cf. Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking
(Recommendation No. 88-9), 54 Fed. Reg. 5207, 5208 (Feb. 2, 1989) (showing ACUS
recommendation that “agency submissions to the office responsible for presidential
review . . . be made available to the public when the decision to terminate is announced”).
These ACUS recommendations were tracked to some extent in the transparency
requirements of President Bill Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866. See Exec. Order No.
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 644–48 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802,
804–06 (2012) (requiring suggestions made by OIRA be identified and communications
between OIRA and agencies be transparent).
67. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2356–57 (2001)
(urging self-restraint in White House review of agencies’ science-intensive rules).
68. Id. at 2357.
69. Id. (cautioning against presidential displacement of determinations by congres-
sionally required science advisory panels).
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that not only should presidential review “operate with an attitude of
respect toward agency experts,” but that “these differences [between the
expertise of agencies and the White House] counsel hesitation both in
acknowledging and asserting presidential authority in areas of admin-
istration in which professional knowledge has a particularly significant
and needed function.”70
B. OIRA’s Review of Technical and Science-Intensive Rules in Practice
Despite the institutional precariousness of White House review of
the micro features of agency science-intensive rules, there is evidence
that, over the last few decades, at least one arm of the White House—
OIRA—has become engaged, sometimes deeply, in the technical details
of agency rules at various points in their development.71 Indeed, there is
reason to believe that this evidence of OIRA’s interventions into the
details of agency rules may be the tip of the iceberg with respect to larger
White House influence in agency science-intensive rulemakings.72 It is
thus clear that ensuring that OIRA involvement is limited to “just the
policy” in its review is not as simple as it sounds. The following section
recounts the evidence of OIRA’s engagement in technical aspects of
agency rules and related decisions.
1. OIRA’s Involvement in Science-Intensive Rules and Policies as Evidenced
by Its Own Statements and Initiatives. — As an institutional matter, OIRA
could potentially provide a high level of deference to science-intensive
rules or even avoid them entirely, but instead, over time, it has developed
policies that seem to do exactly the opposite and allow it to actively
engage in the scientific merits. During the Bush II Administration, in
particular, OIRA made a concerted effort to increase its technical and
scientific staff precisely in order to gain deeper and broader reach over
the technical substance of agency rules.73 As the former Administrator of
70. Id. at 2356.
71. It is not clear whether OIRA believes that heightened review of agency technical
choices is appropriate because its review improves these technical decisions or because OIRA
must engage vigorously in some science-intensive rules to advance the President’s policies.
There is clearly evidence of the latter view, but there is also some evidence that OIRA believes
it serves a useful role in improving the scientific quality of agency rulemakings. Cf. Sunstein,
Myths and Realities, supra note 9, at 1847 (suggesting OIRA, as convener of agencies, may
improve quality of agency decisions).
72. See, e.g., Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 58, at 68–70 (describing numerous
sources of influence originating from White House, only one of which is OIRA).
73. See, e.g., John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The Experience of
the Bush Administration, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 953, 968–69 (2006) (discussing OIRA’s effort
to increase its scientific staff to keep up with science-intensive rules promulgated by
agencies); see also Guest Blogger, OMB Expands Influence over Scientific Decisions, Ctr. for
Effective Gov’t (May 28, 2003), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/1427 [http://perma.cc
/WP5Z-LNYM] (describing OIRA as “expanding its influence over scientific questions that
have previously been left to federal regulatory agencies, hiring a number of scientific experts
for the first time in its history”).
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OIRA, John Graham stated, in an effort to respond to the rapid growth
of environmental and public health regulations,
OIRA hired highly trained experts in fields such as environ-
mental science, engineering, epidemiology, toxicology, public
health, and health policy. Although the small number of new
employees at OIRA may seem modest, OIRA’s ability to ask
tough questions of regulators—and engage in technical
dialogue with agency specialists—has increased substantially.74
Several OIRA directives also made it clear that OIRA was expanding
its reach to oversee the technical features of significant agency rules. A
2001 OIRA memorandum directed desk officers reviewing agency rules
to include an evaluation of “whether the agency has . . . conducted an
adequate risk assessment.”75 OIRA staff members were also instructed to
afford an unspecified “measure of deference” to technical documents
that have been peer reviewed following specified procedures, implying
that technical documents that have not been peer reviewed following
these procedures should not receive the same deference.76
Additionally, over the last fifteen years, OIRA issued guidances
specifying the technical processes agencies should follow in their science-
intensive policymaking. Professors Nicholas Bagley and Richard Revesz
conclude that these guidances serve as “powerful examples of the myriad
ways in which OIRA already monitors agency science and as illustrations of
OIRA’s growing appetite for scientific oversight.”77 Two guidance documents
in particular are notable for their scientific bent—OIRA’s peer-review
guidelines and its largely defunct risk assessment guidelines.78 The peer
74. Graham et al., supra note 73, at 968–69.
75. Memorandum from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs,
on Presidential Review of Agency Rulemaking by OIRA, to President’s Mgmt. Council
(Sept. 20, 2001), https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg_oira_review_process [https:
//perma.cc/3F8G-HAMA] (setting forth principles and procedures governing OIRA’s
review of agency rules).
76. Id. Based on substantial evidence, however, it is not clear whether these peer-
reviewed technical analyses are in fact receiving added deference from OIRA staff. See
infra section II.B.2 (discussing OIRA engagement in agency rulemaking processes).
77. Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory
State, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1316 (2006).
78. Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2665 (Jan.
14, 2005) [hereinafter OMB, Peer Review Quality Bulletin] (showing guidance issued by
OMB in consultation with Office of Science and Technology Policy aimed at improving
“quality of government science while promoting public confidence in the integrity of the
government’s scientific products”); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Proposed Risk Assessment
Bulletin (Jan. 9, 2006), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb
/inforeg/proposed_risk_assessment_bulletin_010906.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKF7-TFQY]
[hereinafter OMB, Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin]. It should be noted that both
guidance documents were developed ostensibly to advance the mandate of the
Information Quality Act, which was passed in 2001. See OMB, Peer Review Quality
Bulletin, supra, at 2666 (noting Bulletin issued under statute’s authority); OMB, Proposed
Risk Assessment Bulletin, supra, at 7 (same). Thus the promulgation of these guidelines
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review guidance requires agencies to “conduct a peer review on all influ-
ential scientific information that the agency intends to disseminate” and
then identifies preferred processes for this expert review.79 The risk
assessment guidelines were similarly intended “to enhance the technical
quality and objectivity of risk assessments prepared by federal agencies by
establishing uniform, minimum standards.”80 In the context of assessing
OIRA’s scientific competency, it is worth noting that both guidances were
heavily criticized by scientific groups,81 and the risk assessment guidance was
ultimately withdrawn because the National Academy of Sciences panel
found it was “fundamentally flawed.”82
In his 2013 essay on OIRA, Cass Sunstein, a former OIRA
Administrator, acknowledged that OIRA’s heavy engagement in the
scientific details of agency rules continued into the Obama Administration.
In his own words, “[t]echnical work is the bread-and-butter of daily life at
OIRA.”83 Professor Sunstein defends this involvement based in part on the
need for OIRA to coordinate interagency disagreements and collect
information from numerous expert agencies.84 As such, he argues that OIRA
operates primarily as a “convener,” rather than a “decider,” in scientific
discussions about agency rules,85 although his perspective is not uniformly
shared by other insiders.86
2. OIRA’s Engagement in Individual Science-Intensive Agency Decisions. —
OIRA’s engagement in agency science-intensive rules can also be appre-
ciated at a more granular level. Some of OIRA’s interventions may simply
attempt to advance the White House’s macro goals, but making policy
changes in a type of “plug and play fashion” is often not possible with
these intricate scientific rules.87 Slipping in a different standard or
compliance requirement—in order to promote a less costly regulation,
under the Bush II Administration is not necessarily a reflection solely of presidential
policies.
79. OMB, Peer Review Quality Bulletin, supra note 78, at 2675.
80. OMB, Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin, supra note 78, at 3.
81. See, e.g., Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 30, at 57–58, 57 n.20 (citing scientific
criticism of both guidances).
82. Nat’l Research Council, Scientific Review of the Proposed Risk Assessment
Bulletin from the Office of Management and Budget 6 (2007); see also Shapiro, supra
note 59, at 1094–95, 1103–06 (providing thoughtful history and critique of this effort).
83. Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 9, at 1872.
84. See id. (arguing OIRA’s main function is to convene and mediate interagency
perspectives on rules rather than advance President’s preferred policies).
85. Id. at 1841–42.
86. Lisa Heinzerling questions this position because OIRA does not identify the
agencies, much less the staff members, raising interagency concerns, leaving the impression
that “no one knows who is really in charge,” particularly the originating agency. Heinzerling,
Inside EPA, supra note 60, at 367.
87. But cf. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and
Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2, 8 (2009) (suggesting agency fact-finding and politics
can be separated in somewhat clear way).
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for example—can undermine other, interrelated features of the rule, a
risk made all the more likely if the policy-based changes are both
invisible and sidestep peer- and public-review processes.88 Even changes
to a rule as seemingly discrete as reducing the number of ambient
monitors can disturb the technical cohesiveness of the rule by reducing
the data available to assess compliance and jeopardizing the statistical
integrity of the sampling program.89
OIRA’s engagement in science-intensive rules is evident in part from
some general surveys and interviews with agencies’ scientific staff. In a
survey of EPA employees conducted by the Union of Concerned Scientists
in 2008, for example, nearly 100 employees reported some evidence of
“OMB’s meddling in EPA decision making [in a way that constitutes] . . . a
major hindrance to the agency’s scientific integrity.”90 Interviews with
higher-level career agency staff (past and present) in EPA and OIRA
reinforce the fact that OIRA sometimes plays a significant role in reviewing
the scientific details of agency rules.91 Anonymous career staff in White
House offices similarly report that OIRA does not refrain from making
technical changes to science-intensive rules; OIRA review instead tends to
88. For example, OIRA added a secondary standard for ozone at the very end of EPA’s
process, after experts had rejected such a move. See, e.g., Steinzor & Shapiro, supra note 24, at
205 (describing this incident); Juliet Eilperin, Ozone Rules Weakened at Bush’s Behest, Wash.
Post (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03
/13/AR2008031304175.html [http://perma.cc/5NNZ-6JWS] (same). The secondary standard
was ultimately struck down by the D.C. Circuit as insufficiently supported, although the court
did not mention OIRA’s role. See Mississippi v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 744 F.3d 1334, 1358–62
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (reasoning “EPA failed to determine what level of protection was requisite to
protect the public welfare” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
89. See, e.g., infra note 113 and accompanying text (describing 20% reduction of
required ambient monitors during OIRA review).
90. Union of Concerned Scientists, Interference at the EPA 28 (2008) (reporting this
finding in nearly 100 surveys conducted of employees in 2007, out of a total of 1,586
surveys returned); see also Mendelson, supra note 8, at 1152–57 (providing overview of
several instances of interference by OIRA and OMB in scientific rulemaking); Steinzor,
supra note 58, at 247–68 (describing changes made to OIRA’s role in reviewing agency
regulations during Bush II Administration and their legacy during Obama
Administration); Rena Steinzor, Michael Patoka & James Goodwin, Behind Closed Doors
at the White House: How Politics Trumps Protection of Public Health, Worker Safety, and
the Environment 29–33 (2011), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/OIRA_
Meetings_1111.pdf [http://perma.cc/VVV9-ZL5U] (discussing OIRA’s disproportionate
targeting of EPA regulations). David Driesen also discusses a number of examples of
changes that may have been at least partly technical in nature that were suggested by
OIRA, including EPA’s decision not to list manganese as a hazardous waste and OMB’s
opposition to more stringent emission limits governing large ships. See David M. Driesen,
Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 335, 367–68 (2006) (providing
examples of OIRA’s changes to agency science-intensive rules).
91. See Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 85–88 (citing interviews with high-
level career staff at EPA and exchanges between EPA and OIRA officials regarding
substantive interventions by OIRA into science-intensive features of EPA’s NAAQS rules).
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drift toward these more esoteric issues.92 There are also specific examples
of OIRA’s engagement in these scientific and technical details. One of the
best-documented examples of OIRA’s engagement in the scientific details
of agency rules arises in a set of agency decisions that actually falls outside
of OIRA’s jurisdiction—EPA’s informal setting of nonbinding standards for
various toxic substances (the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS)).93
Over the last twenty or more years, OIRA has been intimately involved in
setting these IRIS standards. Initially, OIRA—not EPA—determined how
the standards should change in response to interagency comments, set the
pace of the standard-setting, and classified the interagency communi-
cations under the deliberative process privilege.94 Even after 2009 when
then-EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson restricted OIRA’s role, OIRA
continued to serve as a vigorous participant.95 More pertinent for the
purposes of this Essay, nearly all of the comments OIRA makes appear to
be technical in nature.96 Based on its study of OIRA’s involvement in IRIS
92. Id. at 140 n.591 (citing interviews with former OIRA staff about how OIRA review
can get “‘deep’ into the science” of agency rules).
93. See Integrated Risk Information System: What Is IRIS, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
http://www.epa.gov/IRIS/help_ques.htm#whatiris [http://perma.cc/YTD3-27QT] (last visited
Aug. 9, 2015) (describing IRIS as “human health assessment program” capable of evaluating
risks from exposure to environmental contaminants); see also Wagner, ACUS Report, supra
note 24, at 140 (noting IRIS standards fall outside traditional scope of OIRA review outlined in
Executive Order 12,866).
94. See, e.g., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-08-440, Chemical Assessments: Low
Productivity and New Interagency Review Process Limit the Usefulness and Credibility of
EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System 57 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/280
/273184.pdf [http://perma.cc/P9WS-P2S9] [hereinafter GAO, Low Productivity]
(describing OIRA’s significant role in influencing EPA’s IRIS standards and guiding peer
review); see also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-42, Chemical Assessments:
Challenges Remain with EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System app. III, at 34–40 (2011),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586620.pdf [http://perma.cc/KZE5-MX7X] [hereinafter
GAO, Challenges Remain] (describing on chemical-by-chemical basis influential role of
agencies like OMB and Department Of Defense on EPA’s assessments). In 2009, EPA
Administrator Lisa Jackson altered the IRIS process, with EPA now taking the lead on the
assessments and requiring that all written interagency comments be submitted on the record.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, IRIS Progress Report 3–4 (2011), http://www.epagov/IRIS/pdfs/
irisprogressreport2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/VL3G-KDAR] (describing elements of “IRIS
assessment development process”).
Although it was initially a common law creation, the deliberative process privilege is
most commonly invoked by the White House as an exemption to Freedom of Information
Act to withhold “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(5) (2012). See generally Shilpa Narayan, Note, Proper Assertion of the
Deliberative Process Privilege: The Agency Head Requirement, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 1183,
1187–202 (2009) (describing history and development of deliberative process privilege
over time).
95. See GAO, Challenges Remain, supra note 94, app. III, at 24–26 (describing and
criticizing OMB’s role in IRIS assessments); GAO, Low Productivity, supra note 94, at 56–
58 (same).
96. See Wendy E. Wagner, Science in Regulation: A Study of Agency Decisionmaking
Approaches: Appendices, app. F, at 1–6 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
2015] A PLACE FOR AGENCY EXPERTISE 2041
standards, the Majority Staff of the House Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight concluded, “[T]he Subcommittee has ample documen-
tation showing that OIRA’s staff scientists did far more than merely
coordinate and facilitate science discussions across agencies. OIRA’s staff
scientists directly challenged the science put forward by EPA IRIS staff in
very detailed peer review-type comments.”97
There are also accounts of OIRA’s extensive engagement in the
technical details of other science-intensive rules.98 During the Reagan
Administration, for example, OIRA made numerous, nontransparent
technical changes to EPA’s high-level radioactive waste disposal rule; a
number of new source performance standards promulgated under the
Clean Air Act; and EPA’s ambient air quality standard for particulates.99
Likewise, during the Bush II Administration, OIRA actively contributed
to a number of science-intensive rules. Case accounts document the ways
that OIRA intervened in EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) ozone standard,100 EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations,101 and
documents/COR-Science-Report-Appendices-2-27-12.pdf [http://perma.cc/W3GM-QP7T]
[hereinafter Wagner, ACUS Appendices] (providing comments filed on Dichloromethane
(DCM)); see also Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 50 (“[T]he fact that OMB has
historically managed the interagency review of IRIS assessment has led some to question the
scientific credibility of the resulting assessments.”).
97. Majority Staff of the Subcomm. on Investigations & Oversight, Nipping IRIS in
the Bud: Suppression of Environmental Science by the Bush Administration’s Office of
Management and Budget 5 (2009), http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
assets/documents/scientific_integrity/miller-iris-report-june-09.pdf [http://perma.cc/5G
HR-X2F8]. The Majority Staff include in their Report extensive documentation of
communications between OIRA and the agencies and numerous examples of substantive
editorial changes by OIRA to EPA’s characterization of the science. As just one represent-
tative example, OIRA staff made the following edits to EPA’s summary of the scientific
literature in an IRIS profile (OIRA’s edits are in italics): “[T}his may imply that different
activities may expose different age groups more than others, or that some PBDE
congeners may accumulate differently with age, however the sample size here is very small and
firm conclusions cannot be made.” Id. at 7.
98. By the mid-1980s, there were a number of vivid accounts of OIRA’s substantive
interventions into agency technical rules. See Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with
Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1066
(1986) (discussing OMB’s deletion of short-term exposure limit for ethylene oxide
“despite the overwhelming technical support . . . and the concurrence of everyone at the
Department of Labor who reviewed the matter that such a limitation was necessary,” and
FDA oversight of individual GRAS determinations for over-the-counter drugs); see also
infra note 99 and accompanying text (providing numerous examples of such substantive
changes by OIRA).
99. See Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget
Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order
12,291, 4 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 1, 64–73 (1984) (providing quotations from interviews
with officials and excerpts from memoranda and rule drafts revealing highly technical
disputes over key regulatory terms).
100. See, e.g., Heinzerling, Inside EPA, supra note 60, at 354–58 (discussing this
incident).
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technical features of a proposed regulation to protect an endangered
whale from collisions with larger boats.102 There is also evidence that
OIRA’s involvement compromised the scientific integrity of information
shared with the public during the BP oil spill.103 In an even more detailed
case study, Lisa Heinzerling and Rena Steinzor discuss OIRA’s changes to
EPA’s mercury rule, which included recommending language that
downplays the link between mercury and cardiovascular effects and
inserting “several sentences casting some doubt on EPA’s ability, through
the power plant rule, to make a difference in the blood mercury levels in
women.”104
More recently, during the Obama Administration, OIRA engaged in
extensive rewriting of EPA’s coal ash rule.105 Several years later, OIRA
delayed the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s proposed
silica rule for several years while suggesting numerous technical changes to
the rule. These changes apparently included raising the exposure level
that triggers medical monitoring for workers and reducing the frequency
with which at-risk workers should receive medical examinations; both
changes affect technical features of the rule but occurred wholly outside
the science-policy process the agency used to formulate the rule.106 Also in
2013, OIRA made extensive changes to several highly technical Federal
Drug Administration rules on food safety,107 including the elimination of
101. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, White House Refused to Open Pollutants Email, N.Y.
Times (June 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/washington/25epa.
html?_r=0 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing White House refusal to
accept EPA’s “conclusion that greenhouse gases are pollutants that must be controlled”).
102. See, e.g., Strauss, Possible Controls, supra note 2, at 133 n.21 (discussing this
incident).
103. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Scientific Integrity: The Perils and Promise of White
House Administration, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2395, 2411 (2011) (discussing this case study
and controversy over possible OMB interference with early estimate of oil flow rate).
104. Lisa Heinzerling & Rena Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush
Administration, Part II, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,485, 10,491 (2004).
105. See, e.g., Steinzor, supra note 58, at 260–67 (providing detailed case study of
OIRA’s review of rule).
106. See, e.g., Robert Iafolla, After Extended OMB Review, OSHA Cut Silica Rule
Price Tag by Half, Lowered Benefits, 43 Occupational Safety & Health Rep. 1057, 1057–58
(2013) (noting criticism that “it was political pressure not to release any substantial
regulations rather than conducting additional analyses” that precipitated suggestions).
107. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Who Will Run the EPA?, 30 Yale J. on Reg. Online 39,
40 (2013), http://www.yalejreg.com/assets/heinzerling-epa5.pdf [http://perma.cc/L2DK-
VWZ8] (describing changes as “extensive” and “substantive”). In this piece, Heinzerling
reports:
Documents showing extensive changes to the FDA’s rule on the growing,
harvesting, packing and holding of produce for human consumption are
available . . . at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-N-0
921-0029. Documents showing extensive changes to the FDA’s rule on good
manufacturing practice and hazard analysis and risk-based preventive controls
for human food are available . . . at http://www.regulations.gov/#!document
Detail;D=FDA-2011-N-0920-0014.
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monitoring requirements for pathogens in food.108 That same year, OIRA
made significant changes to a technology-based standard issued by EPA,
including adjustments that revised the proposed “BAT/PSES for non-
chemical metal cleaning wastes to exclude discharges from certain facilities
from the proposed effluent limits for copper and iron.”109
In a more focused study of an entire set of EPA air quality rules—the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)—this author examined
both quantitatively and qualitatively the nature of OIRA’s involvement
based on the available public administrative record.110 The full results are
detailed in a lengthy ACUS report, but the overarching finding was that
OIRA did engage in revising the technical features of these rules. In fact,
the majority of the changes made by OIRA (typically several dozen in
number) were technical in nature, either altering the agency’s explanation
or features of the rule itself.111
While it is not possible without significant additional detective work to
determine the significance of these aggregate technical changes occurring
during OIRA’s review, a tally of the most substantial changes reveals some
potentially major alterations in EPA’s rules.112 For at least two rules, the
required number of ambient monitors was reduced by about 20% while the
Id. at 40 n.5.
108. See, e.g., Helena Bottemiller, Documents Show OMB Weakened FDA’s Food
Safety Rules, Food Safety News (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013
/03/documents-show-omb-weakened-fdas-food-safety-rules/#.VcwMlRNViko
[https://perma.cc/2UZT-UUSX] (noting agency favored monitoring requirements and
describing criticisms of OIRA’s edits).
109. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Documentation of OMB Review Under Executive Order
12866: Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam Electric Power Generating
Point Source Category 2 (May 5, 2010), http://op.bna.com/env.nsf/id/aada-9acp6x/$File
/ELG%20Redline.pdf [http://perma.cc/WC6Q-7GEQ]; see also Anthony Adragna, Document
Shows Power Plant Guidelines Rule Significantly Altered in White House Review, BNA Env’t
Rep. (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.bna.com/document-shows-power-n17179875765/ [http://
perma.cc/Z89V-QV3G] (describing extent of OMB revisions).
110. See Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 21–28 (providing detailed discussion
of methods employed in empirical study).
111. Id. at 75–91 (providing more detailed discussion of findings of empirical
investigation).
112. In its 2009 report, the Government Accountability Office identified about 30% of
the rules it reviewed as involving significant changes that “affected the scope, impact, or
estimated costs and benefits of the rules.” U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-09-205,
Improvements Needed to Monitoring and Evaluation of Rules Development as Well as to
the Transparency of OMB Regulatory Reviews 29 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d09205.pdf [http://perma.cc/F278-TB3B]. For a first-hand look at the changes made by
OIRA in the NAAQS rule, see, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Primary National Ambient Air
Quality Standard for Sulfur Dioxide (unpublished document), https://utexas.app.box.
com/s/mq9360hjrwy8gz961894 (click on first document in list) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last visited Aug. 28, 2015) (recording changes made during OIRA review to
most NAAQS rules). The list provides the redlined documents that record the changes
made during OIRA review to most of the NAAQS rules.
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rules were under review at OIRA.113 During OIRA review, EPA also adopted
the primary standard to serve as the secondary standard for the oxides of
nitrogen and sulfur—EPA had initially declined to set a secondary
standard—and loosened the secondary standard for ozone.114 OIRA’s
influence could not be identified in several other rules because the changes
made during its review were not recorded.115 But the fact that there were
numerous documented (and often privileged) exchanges between OIRA
and EPA on these rules (more than 110 exchanges on each) gives one the
impression that OIRA’s influence may have been quite significant.116
Finally, OMB returned two of the NAAQS ozone rules in 2011, primarily
due to concerns about the effect of the rules on the economy.117
This empirical study of OIRA’s engagement in EPA’s NAAQS rules
also reveals that OIRA’s influence is not always limited to the formal
review period. Although the docketed exchanges vary a great deal from
rule to rule, overall nearly half of the communications between OIRA
113. For the Word-generated, track-changes document that highlights this change in
the nitrogen dioxide final rule, see U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Primary National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for Nitrogen Dioxide (Feb. 9, 2010) (unpublished document),
https://utexas.box.com/s/l4n4eywn4jkxt660z9yv (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Nitrogen Dioxide Redline]. For the equivalent change in the carbon
monoxide final rule, see U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Review of National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for Carbon Monoxide 100–01 (unpublished document), https://utexas.
box.com/s/8g1dgjljph13ypf2m3g4ru57q0smbcr8 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(last visited Aug. 28, 2015).
114. Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 87–88.
115. EPA did not record the changes made by OIRA in the Primary NAAQS review for
lead (proposed and final) or in the primary NAAQS review for nitrogen dioxide
(proposed and final). With regard to the nitrogen dioxide standard, EPA did post both the
proposed and final rules before they were submitted to OIRA. A Word-generated
comparison of the final rule pre-OIRA review and the rule published in the Federal
Register (prepared by this author) provides an informal record of the changes made while
the final rule was under review at OIRA. See Nitrogen Dioxide Redline, supra note 113.
116. For the list of docketed exchanges that were included in EPA’s much larger rule
docket for the lead NAAQS rule, with hyperlinks to the original documents, see Wendy E.
Wagner, Documentation for Lead Rule (July 7, 2013) (unpublished Excel spreadsheet),
https://utexas.box.com/s/101mijgvt78xx2525tec0qphajpc8ij4 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (providing Excel list collecting all OIRA and interagency review documents on this
rule). For the list of docketed exchanges between EPA and OIRA on the nitrogen dioxide rule,
see Wendy E. Wagner, Documentation for Nitrogen Oxide Rule (July 10, 2012) (unpublished
Excel spreadsheet), https://utexas.box.com/s/tq8588cphch1ty0qapim66b7bev7h571 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (same). This author has compiled Excel lists of all EPA–OMB
correspondence available for each of the rules in this study. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, EPA-
HQ-OAR-2010-0885 (July 24, 2014) (unpublished document), https://utexas.app.box.com
/s/kjj7y9lbb9fqgzcnc6q2/1/2242849137 (click on first document in list) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (documenting correspondence over ozone classification rule).
117. See Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 1–2 (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/ozone_national_ambient_air_quality_standards_letter.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G5QU-BS23] (emphasizing President’s instruction to Administrator to
work with agencies “to minimize regulatory costs and burdens, particularly in this
economically challenging time”).
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and EPA on the air quality standards occurred outside the formal window
of OMB review.118 Indeed, some agency staff members report that OIRA
can require informal consultation, and even advanced permission, before
accepting an agency proposal for review.119 Much like the individual
redline documents that record the changes made during OIRA review,
an examination of these pre-review OIRA documents (some were not
classified as deliberative process) reveals quite specific disagreements
between OIRA and EPA in their interpretation of scientific evidence.120
In sum, while the record of OIRA’s engagement in science-intensive
rules is highly incomplete, the information that is available reveals
potentially significant involvement by OIRA in the technical features of
many of these rules throughout the decisionmaking processes.121 Some of
OIRA’s interventions may be motivated by an effort to advance particular
policy ends, such as lower-cost regulation, but the changes themselves relate
to features of the rules that are decidedly technical. Thus, although there
are compelling reasons to maintain executive involvement in agency
rulemaking, given the increasingly careful methods used by agencies,
permitting nontransparent involvement by OIRA risks compromising the
accountability and legitimacy of science-intensive and technical rulemaking.
III. THE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF OIRA REVIEW ON AGENCY EXPERTISE
While historically, or at least prior to the 1980s, agencies were the
primary authors of their rules and supporting preambles, today the White
House, through OIRA, appears to serve as an invisible partner in
developing at least some of them, contributing significantly but in ways
that largely escape review and oversight. Through these interventions,
moreover, OIRA appears to act more as a senior partner than another
interagency voice. As an office of the White House, OIRA enjoys
considerable prestige in its dealings with the agencies, but potentially still
more important is the fact that OMB, within which OIRA is located,
reviews and approves the agencies’ budgets before they are sent to
118. See Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 79–84 (analyzing chart comparing
number of exchanges inside OMB review window to number of exchanges outside
window); cf. Curtis W. Copeland, Length of Rule Reviews by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs 36–37 (2013), http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Co
peland%20Report%20CIRCULATED%20to%20Committees%20on%2010-21-13.pdf [http:
//perma.cc/32QB-VLUK] [hereinafter Copeland, ACUS Study] (noting “documentation
of [OIRA’s] informal reviews was usually not included in the rulemaking dockets”).
119. See Copeland, ACUS Study, supra note 118, at 36, 38 (reporting on this trend
based on interviews with agency staff).
120. See Wagner, ACUS Appendices, supra note 96, app. F, at 1–6 (listing several
instances where OIRA criticized EPA for failing to reflect expert opinion in assessments).
121. Dr. Copeland cautions that the existing evidence “probably understates the
influence that OIRA has on agencies’ rules” to the extent that the evidence requires
documentation of OIRA’s involvement. Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1257, 1284
(2005) [hereinafter Copeland, Role of OIRA].
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Congress.122 By all accounts, then, OIRA’s influence is substantial.123
Agencies that choose to ignore or resist OIRA’s suggestions do so at their
peril.
These unrestricted and nontransparent opportunities for political
oversight and editing of agency technical analyses—analyses presented to
the public as grounded in scientific or technical evidence—create a
number of instabilities in the administrative process. This Part identifies
costs to the regulatory process from the current institutional design.
Section III.A explores the adverse effects of White House intervention on
the scientific integrity of agency rules. Section III.B then considers the
negative implications of these interventions on the institutional checks
and balances of congressional oversight and judicial review. Section III.C
concludes by exploring how nontransparent policy-driven changes to the
technical features of agency rules make the rules more vulnerable to
capture and other subterranean influences hidden from public view.
A. Undermining the Scientific Integrity of Agency Analyses
Expert agencies rely primarily on rigorous processes to enhance the
scientific and policy integrity of their decisions; yet, if the end result can
be altered behind the scenes by a political office, the agencies’ pro-
cedures can be rendered futile or even deceptive in a number of
reinforcing ways. For this reason, as previously noted, Justice Kagan,
along with a number of other commenters, stresses the need for OIRA to
tread lightly in its oversight of science-intensive rules.124 Nina Mendelson,
for example, argues that if greater transparency reveals that OIRA is
“second-guessing an agency’s more technical or scientific conclusions . . .
then we might start to see executive review as less legitimate to the extent
it operates to skew or displace the expertise that has long resided within
the agencies.”125 Lisa Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh simply con-
clude, “OIRA should avoid issues that outstrip its institutional compe-
tence” such as “agency scientific determinations.”126
When OIRA has neither explained its role, nor publicly justified the
changes it suggests, it can undermine the legitimacy and reliability of
122. See, e.g., Bruff, Presidential Management, supra note 52, at 552–53 (describing
power of OMB over agency budgets).
123. See, e.g., Copeland, Role of OIRA, supra note 121, at 1278 (discussing OIRA’s
considerable authority over agency rules and concluding although agencies have final say,
they “rarely publish rules that OIRA returns or ignore substantive OIRA ‘suggestions’”); cf.
supra text accompanying note 57 (describing presidential influence over rulemaking).
124. See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text (recounting views of commenters in
urging caution with respect to White House review of science-intensive agency decisions); see
also Kagan, supra note 67, at 2357 (“[T]here is no good reason for a President to displace or
ignore purely scientific determinations—as to the kinds of questions, say, on which Congress
often instructs agencies to seek opinions from outside advisory committees.”).
125. Mendelson, supra note 8, at 1177.
126. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 58, at 97–98.
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science-intensive rules in a number of different ways, some of which are
explored below.
1. Ends-Oriented Bias in OIRA’s Engagement in Agency Rules. — In
science, sponsor influence at early stages of a research project presents a
significant risk of biasing the research in statistically significant ways, a
process dubbed the “funding effect”;127 political pressure on agency ana-
lysts, whether from appointees, the Office of the President, or OIRA staff,
can lead to the same result.128 Indeed, rather than allowing agency staff
to scope out a range of alternative solutions to problems, pressure from
management could force analysts to identify the “best” political option
and form their analysis around that option without considering the
broader alternatives.129 Such pressure not only compromises the inde-
pendence of the analysis but biases it in ways that may escape scrutiny
since the ends-oriented choices the “sponsors” make can become deeply
embedded in the technical, scientific analysis the agency produces.130
There are scattered reports of this ends-oriented political biasing
within the executive branch, although most involve political pressure on
staff scientists from agency appointees rather than from the White House
itself. One of the best-documented examples occurred during the Bush
II Administration, when then-Deputy Secretary of the Interior, Julie
MacDonald, advanced her ideological agenda by interfering with the
listing of some key endangered species.131 By bullying the scientific staff,
particularly during her review of their preliminary reports, MacDonald
managed to change the scientific record for dozens of candidate endan-
gered species and critical habitat designations.132 In her study of the
search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Judge Patricia Wald simi-
larly notes how political appointees—albeit more unwittingly—served to
bias staff analysis through subtle pressure and minor technical
changes.133 Investigative reporters have also uncovered evidence of
127. See, e.g., Justin E. Bekelman, Yan Li & Cary P. Gross, Scope and Impact of Financial
Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systemic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 463 (2003)
(“By combining data from articles examining 1140 studies, we found that industry-sponsored
studies were significantly more likely to reach conclusions that were favorable to the sponsor
than were nonindustry studies.”).
128. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 99, at 47 (citing interview during which EPA Assistant
Administrator Drayton expressed concern that early OMB engagement “over-politicizes the
EPA background scientific work before it has had a chance to see the light of day”).
129. See, e.g., Wagner, Science Charade, supra note 6, at 1644–50 (discussing ex-
amples of “premeditated charade” in which agency officials select outcome and form
analysis around predetermined ends).
130. See supra section I.B.3 (explaining this problem).
131. See Report, Endangered Species Act, supra note 40, at 1–2 (discussing Deputy
Secretary MacDonald’s abuse of authority in making endangered species decisions).
132. See generally Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity, supra note 42, at 1604–
09 (describing this and other assaults on scientific integrity of federal rulemakings).
133. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Analysts and Policymakers: A Confusion of Roles?, 17
Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 241, 265–66 (2006) (describing pressures on analyst to “alter her
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executive branch officials editing reports on climate change134 and hold-
ing back information in scientific reports.135 Heidi Kitrosser has even
documented White House efforts to silence the scientists themselves,
including the Bush II Administration’s censoring of climate change scien-
tists working for executive agencies.136 In all of these cases, the ability of
political management to pressure agency scientists led to a biasing effect
that produced unreliable or highly incomplete scientific analyses.
In terms of its impacts on agency decisions, in fact, this early inter-
vention by political management and OIRA staff could be even more
consequential than the changes made much later, at the end of the
process during OIRA’s formal review. Early, invisible political pressure on
staff analysts can fundamentally undermine the independence of the
agency’s work and lead to analyses that are incomplete or even mis-
leading.137 This biasing effect is also much harder to trace. Although the
agency’s rule may still be subject to peer and public review, the literature
on the funding effect reveals that this ends-oriented influence can often
slip through the cracks of traditional review, infiltrating the analysis in
multiple, invisible ways.138
2. Undercutting Expert-Peer Review of Agency Rules. — Most agencies
are required to or voluntarily subject their influential rules to elaborate
forms of external peer review,139 but OIRA’s changes are often made at
points in the process that are exempt from this expert oversight. For
example, under the Clean Air Act, EPA seeks reviews from the highly
respected Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) at every
stage in the development of its NAAQS rules.140 In other regulatory
programs, agencies have developed peer review processes that are almost
judgments based on what she thinks the policymaker wants to hear and how [the
policymaker’s] good graces might benefit or injure [an analyst’s] career”).
134. See, e.g., Revkin, supra note 39 (“A White House official who once led the oil
industry’s fight against limits on greenhouse gases has repeatedly edited government climate
reports in ways that play down links between such emissions and global warming, according to
internal documents.”).
135. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Bending Science: How
Special Interests Corrupt Public Health Research 124–25 (2008) (describing officials’
withholding information pertaining to air pollution after 9/11).
136. See Kitrosser, supra note 103, at 2406–07 (“Given the degree and blatancy of its
attempts to control scientific information, the Bush Administration offered some textbook
examples of political interference in science.”).
137. See also Mendelson, supra note 8, at 1141–44 (recounting examples throughout
federal and state government).
138. See, e.g., supra note 127 and accompanying text (describing “funding effect”);
see also McGarity & Wagner, supra note 135, at 60–96 (describing various techniques of
“shaping science”).
139. See OMB, Peer Review Quality Bulletin, supra note 78, at 2667–72 (establishing
government-wide guidance regarding peer review of government science documents).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) (2012) (prescribing CASAC’s involvement in
formulation and revision of NAAQS rules).
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as elaborate, referring difficult science-policy issues to external scientists
for their review and opinion.141
But with respect to at least OIRA’s formal review, since its inter-
vention occurs after this process, the changes made by OIRA not only
escape peer review but could actually undermine the review that has
already occurred.142 Rogene Henderson, a former Chair of EPA’s CASAC,
underscores this possibility in his testimony to Congress. He observed
during his tenure that, as a result of OIRA’s last minute intervention into
the secondary ozone standard, “[w]illful ignorance triumphed over
sound science.”143 He elaborated: “It bothers me, with all the hard work
that went into this by the EPA staff and by CASAC to develop this
different form for a secondary standard that someone can just, for no
transparent reason, say, no, can’t do that. That is what I meant by willful
ignorance.”144
OIRA’s belated engagement in the substance of science-intensive rules
appears to violate even its own peer-review bulletin, which requires that all
significant changes to the scientific analysis supporting an agency’s rule be
subjected to scientific peer review.145 Particularly since they are generally
classified as deliberative process and escape more general public oversight,
in fact, some form of expert peer review of OIRA’s more significant
changes seems particularly warranted.
3. The Lack of Transparency of OIRA Review. — Transparency is not
only a cornerstone of scientific integrity146 but of the administrative
process.147 To advance this core principle, regulatory agencies like EPA
141. See Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 113–15 (describing agencies’
methods of using external-peer reviewers to improve agency projects).
142. Cf. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 54, 56 n.123 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(observing when “[c]ompromises, fall-back positions, and the so-called ‘real facts’ are
often reserved for” off-the-record communications, “the elaborate public discussion in
these dockets has been reduced to a sham”).
143. EPA’s New Ozone Standards: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 91 (2008).
144. Id. at 117.
145. See OMB, Peer Review Quality Bulletin, supra note 78, at 2665 (setting forth
guidelines for peer review of scientific information likely to impact public policies or
private sector decisions). Although OMB is silent on whether significant changes made to
an agency’s scientific analysis that occur wholly after peer review must be resubjected to a
second round of expert review, it seems implicit in OMB’s basic directive that influential
science that supports regulation must be subject to peer review.
146. See, e.g., Nat’l Acads. of Scis., Responsible Science, Volume I: Ensuring the Integrity
of the Research Process 10–11 (1992) (underscoring importance of transparency to scientific
integrity); Robert K. Merton, Science and Technology in a Democratic Order, 1 J. Legal &
Pol. Soc. 115 (1942), reprinted as The Normative Structure of Science, in The Sociology of
Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations 267, 270–73 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973)
(identifying communal sharing of data and information as key norm of science).
147. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative
Impulse, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2119 (2005) (describing accountability as “basic mechanism of
administrative or bureaucratic government”); Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of
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endeavor to assemble public databases that summarize, and sometimes
link to, each study that forms the basis for their rulemakings.148 Docket
indices typically record every (nonprivileged) exchange that occurs in
the process of the agencies’ decisionmaking, log every study that is
considered, and make the data underlying federally funded studies
publicly available.149 Agency-initiated public hearings and open meetings
provide additional opportunities for parties to access the agency’s
ongoing analysis and take part in that process.150 Even the CASAC peer-
review process,151 has an important transparency component that in-
cludes making the peer-review comments and the agency’s underlying
responses available.152
In contrast to the transparency of the agencies’ decisionmaking
processes, OIRA review is largely nontransparent.153 Professors Bagley
and Revesz observe that “delay and secrecy have long been the hallmarks
of OIRA review, and current OIRA practice has not gone far to
ameliorate these problems,”154 an observation reinforced in the work of
others, most notably Professor Mendelson.155 In their empirical study of
EPA staff, Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh report that “97% of
EPA respondents stated that White House involvement was either not
visible . . . or only somewhat visible to the public.”156 Moreover, “Of the
Law, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 57–61 (2008) (explaining duty to provide reasoning arises from funda-
mental rule of law principles that expect state to justify its actions).
148. See, e.g., Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 112 (describing example of
NAAQS program’s HERO literature public database).
149. See Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (detailing amount of and
specific instructions regarding allocation of appropriations for government departments,
agencies, and corporations).
150. For example, in setting ambient air quality standards, EPA hosts a kick-off workshop
that solicits comments from the public and scientific community (including invited scientists)
about developments in science that should frame EPA’s review. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Generic NAAQS Review Process (2007), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/pdfs/peacock
_4_17_07_attachment2.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y7H5-QYLG] (indicating “workshop on science-
policy issues” is first step in generic NAAQS review process).
151. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (describing CASAC process in greater
detail).
152. See, e.g., Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 114 (explaining EPA staff reports of
proposed revisions to air quality standards are reviewed by science advisory body).
153. President Reagan was apparently responsible for institutionalizing secrecy in OIRA
review. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 98, at 1067–68 (describing problematic secrecy of
OIRA review under President Reagan); Olson, supra note 99, at 58–60 (describing
consequences of secrecy in OMB commentary on EPA rules under President Reagan).
154. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 77, at 1282.
155. See Mendelson, supra note 8, at 1149–57 (“Despite the directives and the
executive order disclosure requirements . . . public information about the content of
executive supervision of an agency decision itself . . . is surprisingly rare.”).
156. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 58, at 78; see also Sally Katzen, A Reality
Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on “Inside the Administrative State,” 105 Mich.
L. Rev. 1497, 1502–03 (2007) (recognizing lack of transparency but arguing results of
White House involvement provided greater political accountability).
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respondents who had awareness of the contents of the record, 90% stated
that the record either rarely or sometimes did not contain evidence of
White House involvement; the remaining 10% said it never did.”157
Consistent with Executive Order 12,866 and as discussed in section
II.B.2, some agencies do post within their larger rulemaking dockets a
redlined version of the proposed or final rule that identifies the changes
that occurred during OIRA’s formal review.158 Some agencies may even
include in their larger rulemaking docket some of their communications
with OIRA, although the underlying substance of these communications
is often omitted.159 Yet even for this limited record, the agencies rarely if
ever identify the specific changes that were made at the insistence of
OIRA as opposed to other agency actors; the rationale for these changes;
or the policy implications that flow from them.160
4. OIRA’s Ghost-Authorship of Agency Analyses. — In the current
formulation of White House review, OIRA effectively serves as co-author
on the rules that it reviews, but it shoulders little to none of the
responsibility for that authorship. Therefore, much like a ghostwriter,
this powerful, silent partner may be inclined to take greater risks than
the agency ordinarily would because of its invisibility and unaccount-
ability.161 One could even imagine a President acting hypocritically by
publicly claiming credit for heightened agency scientific integrity on the
one hand, but secretly advancing the interests of specific constituencies
by suggesting esoteric and generally nontransparent changes to agency
science-intensive and technical rules on the other hand.
Still worse than this lack of attribution for presidential review is the
possibility that the changes suggested by OIRA staff may actually lack the
presidential stamp of approval in the first place.162 Both Cynthia Farina
and Jennifer Nou identify a number of ways that OIRA staff can be
insulated from direct accountability to their White House managers,
leading to a disconnect between the suggestions made by OIRA and
157. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 58, at 81.
158. See, e.g., Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 76–85 (documenting EPA’s
incomplete compliance with Executive Order 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(E)).
159. See id. (discussing these irregular docketing practices).
160. See id. (concluding agencies rarely demarcate or explain OIRA changes to rules).
161. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 103, at 2406, 2418 (describing these perverse
political incentives). Even in cases when the differences between agency staff and OIRA
staff involve only the sufficiency of the available evidence to support a particular policy, the
fact that OIRA’s differing perspective is invisible and attributed instead to the agency
alone is problematic. See, e.g., Heather E. Douglas, Scientific Integrity in a Politicized
World, in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the Fourteenth
International Congress (Peter Schroeder-Heister et al. eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at
15) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (using philosophy of science literature to
illustrate problematic implications of nontransparency).
162. See, e.g., Strauss, Overseer or Decider, supra note 3, at 972–73, 983–84 (addressing
political implications of President accepting responsibility for agency rulemaking).
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larger presidential priorities.163 Various accounts of agency practice
provide added confirmation of a possible divergence between OIRA’s
suggestions and presidential priorities. Professors Bressman and
Vandenbergh, for example, report that “[m]any EPA respondents appear
to believe that the OIRA career staff use that room to substitute their
own institutional biases against regulation.”164 Professor Heinzerling
raises similar concerns based on her experience inside EPA. In her
words:
In my two years at EPA, I do not recall ever hearing of Vice-
Presidential involvement in a regulatory matter . . . . It was far
messier and more ill-defined than that. From my perspective, it
was often hard to tell who exactly was in charge of making the
ultimate decision on an important regulatory matter.165
Given this limited assurance of internal White House coordination,
commentators question whether the unappointed staff at OIRA should
be allowed to override the work of presidential appointees working in the
agencies.166 Indeed, absent clear presidential authorization, the views of
the Administrator of EPA would seem to deserve precedence over
demands made by career staff at OIRA; but in practice the reverse is true.
Indeed, the risks of contestable interventions appear even greater for the
numerous, intricate changes that OIRA staff can make to science-
intensive and technical rules since these modifications are likely to fall
under the presidential radar and similarly lack evidence of a presidential
directive.167 Without cataloging and explaining the various changes, both
external mechanisms of expert review and internal mechanisms of
accountability break down.
163. See Farina, supra note 57, at 411 (suggesting number of executive appointees and
varying levels of appointee competency and skill contribute to divergence from president’s
priorities); Nou, supra note 48, at 1801 (“The decision whether to elevate an issue to
higher-level decisionmakers will likely depend on the respective staff members’ senses of
the political dynamics and whether their arguments might prevail during the resulting
negotiations.”); see also Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 984–85 (“[T]he
President is simply in error and disserves the democracy he leads when he behaves as if
rulemakings were his rulemakings.”).
164. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 58, at 75.
165. Heinzerling, Inside EPA, supra note 60, at 342.
166. As Professor Morrison noted thirty years ago:
It is one thing for OMB to play the role of institutional skeptic, questioning an
agency in order to be sure that it has considered matters thoroughly. It is quite
another for it to second-guess technical decisions made by career personnel, let
alone those of Cabinet officers or other agency heads confirmed by the Senate.
Morrison, supra note 98, at 1067; see also Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 58, at 70,
98–99 (raising “concern about whether White House involvement, whether exercised by
OIRA or other offices, is too idiosyncratic to constitute a model of agency legitimacy”);
McGarity, Presidential Control, supra note 58, at 451, 455–56 (describing OMB as “agency
that has a mission of advancing its own extra-statutory policy preferences over another
agency’s statutory goals”).
167. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 1422 (concluding “influence on agency
action by ‘presidential review’ often will not reflect the judgment of the President himself”).
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B. Undermining Institutional Checks and Balances as a Result of
Nontransparent OIRA Review
Administrative agencies in the United States are held accountable
through multiple sources of institutional oversight—not only by the
President but also by Congress and the courts.168 Yet when the President
enjoys added, largely invisible power to influence science-intensive rules,
it undermines corresponding disciplining mechanisms.
For its part, Congress maintains multiple methods of overseeing
agency actions, and in this regard, agency science-intensive decisions
have been subjected to particularly intricate legislative controls. Over just
the last few decades, for example, Congress has imposed increasingly
elaborate requirements on agencies for data quality169 and data
transparency170 and has added more extensive peer-review requirements
to several regulatory programs.171 Congress has even gone so far as to
demand that agencies use only the “best available science” in select
programs, signaling its high scientific ambitions for agency rules.172 A
steady stream of legislative proposals threatens even more demanding
requirements for the future, including additional data transparency, peer
review, and analytical requirements.173 But if the White House can
request or effectively insist on changes to the science-intensive rules
without identifying or explaining the changes, then these backdoor
political interventions undermine the principle objectives of these legis-
latively prescribed procedures.
168. See, e.g., Strauss, Institutional Design and Ethos, supra note 1, at 269
(diagramming agency oversight relationships).
169. See, e.g., Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year
2001 § 515, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-154 (2000) (seeking to
“ensur[e] and maximiz[e] the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information
(including statistical information) disseminated by Federal agencies”).
170. See, e.g., Data Access Act, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,926, 54,930 (Oct. 8, 1999) (granting
federal government “right to . . . [o]btain, reproduce, publish or otherwise use the data
first produced under an award”).
171. See, e.g., Amendment to the Clean Water Act for BP Damage Assessments, 33
U.S.C. § 1321(t)(1)(E) (2012) (stipulating caliber of data quality for Trust Fund grants for
Gulf Coast states); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(A) (2012)
(requiring agency administrators use “best available, peer-reviewed science and supporting
studies conducted in accordance with sound and objective scientific practices” and collect
data via “accepted methods or best available methods”).
172. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(1)(E). See generally Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects,
and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 Envtl. L.
397, 418–32 (2004) (describing potential motivations for Congress’s best available science
mandate).
173. See, e.g., 160 Cong. Rec. H1686 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2014) (proposing “bill to prohibit
the Environmental Protection Agency from proposing, finalizing, or disseminating
regulations or assessments based upon science that is not transparent or reproducible”); 159
Cong. Rec. S3760 (daily ed. May 22, 2013) (proposing bill to “reauthorize and modernize
the Toxic Substances Control Act”).
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Invisible White House review also undermines Congress’s legislative
delegations to the agencies-as-experts. In his important article on White
House review, Professor Strauss argues that while it is institutionally
appropriate and even desirable for the White House to serve as overseer
of agency decisions, when it acts as “decider” in statutes that delegate the
decision to the agency, the White House exceeds its legal and perhaps
even constitutional authority.174 Yet, whether the White House role falls
into one or the other box—decider versus overseer—is effectively inscru-
table under the current approach to OIRA review. For example, disputes
between agencies can be “elevated” to the White House, but the fact of
that elevation as well as the ensuing discussions can be hidden from
view.175 Indeed, if legally it is important to be able to ascertain whether
the President is acting as “overseer” or “decider,” then heightened
transparency over this presidential role is imperative.
The courts’ review of agency rules is also undermined when the
White House is able to exert undisclosed influence over the agencies’
science-intensive rules.176 Throughout the last four decades of judicial
review, courts have generally deferred to the agencies-as-experts in their
review of rulemakings,177 particularly when an agency provides reasoned
explanations for its position.178 But this long-standing doctrinal approach
is in jeopardy if the contested choices are the result of unacknowledged,
last-minute “suggestions” from the White House. The supporting analysis
becomes post hoc and ends-oriented rather than an honest and rigorous
engagement with the evidence that is vetted through deliberative
processes and peer review.
174. Strauss, Overseer or Decider, supra note 3, at 737–38, 749–50 (delineating
institutional difference between President as “decider” and President as “overseer” of
agency action and arguing former is inappropriate); accord Kevin M. Stack, The
President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 263, 276–99
(2006) (arguing statutes delegating authority to agencies should not be read to include
president as implied recipient of authority).
175. See, e.g., Heinzerling, Inside EPA, supra note 60, at 362 (noting OIRA does not
disclose to public when elevations occur nor explain to agencies why items on regulatory
agenda “do not fit with the President’s agenda”).
176. In the words of Professor Strauss, “[T]he structure of judicial review of adminis-
trative action depends, top to bottom, on the presumption that the matter being reviewed
is in some respects the product of an expert, not merely a political judgment.” Strauss,
Overseer or Decider, supra note 3, at 752.
177. See, e.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983) (“[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making predictions,
within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examining this kind of
scientific determination . . . a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.”);
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 902 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(deferring to agency decisions on frontiers of scientific knowledge), vacated in part, appeal
dismissed in part, 921 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998,
1004–05 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (deferring to agency when issue concerns battle of experts).
178. See infra notes 181–182 and accompanying text (describing courts’ predicating
deference on notion that agencies made decisions based on deliberative process).
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There appear to be at least two overlapping justifications for the
courts’ deference to agency experts, both of which are undermined by
OIRA review. First, some courts provide agencies “‘an extreme degree of
deference . . . when [the agency] “is evaluating scientific data within its
technical expertise,”’”179 in large part because it is the agency, rather than
the judiciary, who possesses greater knowledge and familiarity with
respect to complex, science-policy issues.180 Clearly, however, if some of
the decisions are suggested by White House staff off the record and
outside of the analysis process, then the courts’ basis for deference no
longer holds. Judges are no less technically competent than political
officials; indeed with respect to science-intensive analyses, their distance
from politics may actually make them more competent.
Other courts seem to predicate their extra deference not so much on
the agency’s superior scientific staff as on the fact that the agencies have
made their decisions based on an elaborate and somewhat democratic
analytical-deliberative process.181 The agencies’ use of science advisory
boards, elaborate internal and external mechanisms of peer review, and
public comment processes all provide internal checks on their analysis,
resulting in the kind of rigorous decisionmaking process entitled to
judicial deference.182
If changes can be made invisibly and outside of this deliberative
process by the White House, this second basis for deference to the agency
rule is no longer justified either. In fact, there is some evidence that courts
vacate agency rules precisely for this reason, when evidence reveals that
political staff works behind the scenes to alter the agency’s technical
analysis without explanation. In their essay on Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency, Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule
identify a line of cases that they attribute to the courts’ impatience with
“executive override of expert judgments”183 in ways that “appear to
disregard established professional or bureaucratic practices and
procedures.”184 While the courts’ remands are based explicitly on the lack
of “reasoned explanation” by the agency for certain key agency choices, in
at least some of the cases, the record presented to the court revealed that
these unexplained choices were in fact made by the President after the
179. City of Waukesha v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 320 F.3d 228, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting
Huls Am., Inc. v. Browner, 83 F.3d 445, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also, e.g., Christopher D.
Ahlers, Presidential Authority over EPA Rulemaking Under the Clean Air Act, 44 Envtl. L. 31,
69 n.295 (2014) (supporting proposition that “court has routinely stated that the review of
technical and scientific determinations merits the highest level of deference”).
180. See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650–51 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (making this point).
181. See, e.g., Meazell, supra note 30, at 739–43 (identifying such reasoned
decisionmaking as primary basis for judicial deference to agency science).
182. See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text (describing these processes).
183. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 30, at 93–94 (suggesting courts are
suspicious of “executive usurpation” of determinations usually made by agency experts).
184. Id. at 94.
2056 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:2019
deliberative process had concluded.185 While the courts in several cases
fastidiously avoid even mentioning this eleventh-hour executive
intervention into the challenged agency choices, much less making it the
basis for reversal,186 the fact that these interventions were both
nontransparent and fell outside the agency’s deliberative processes may
have caused courts to look more critically at the agency’s ex post
justifications in the preamble and reject the rule based on its lack of a
“reasoned explanation.”187
But the primary problem with this “reasoned explanation” test lies
less with its application—given that courts have used it to detect at least
some ends-oriented changes to agency rules in cases where OIRA’s role
surfaces through the record—and more with the courts’ remedy. Once an
unsupported standard or decision is caught by the “reasoned explanation”
test, the court remands the rule for explanation.188 But on remand, it is the
agency—not the President—who must supply the missing rationale.189 And
in responding to this remand, the agency has two options: It can provide
an explanation based on its understanding of the White House’s changes
185. In a case that postdates Professors Freeman and Vermeule’s analysis, Mississippi v.
Environmental Protection Agency, the D.C. Circuit remanded EPA’s secondary ozone standard
for lack of explanation, although the change was made by OIRA. See 744 F.3d 1334, 1362
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (remanding standard for reconsideration); see also Bruff, Presidential
Management, supra note 52, at 572 (discussing how “hasty decisions” involved in OIRA
review increase vulnerability of rules to judicial reversal); Driesen, supra note 90, at 367
(describing similar judicial reversal of EPA Clean Water Act entrainment rule due to
inadequately supported restoration provision inserted by OIRA).
186. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Classical Administrative Law in the Era of Presidential
Administration: Response to Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World
of Administrative Law, 92 Tex. L. Rev. See Also 171, 177–79 (2014), http://www.texaslrev
.com/classical-administrative-law-in-the-era-of-presidential-administration-response-to-
daniel-farber-and-anne-joseph-oconnell-the-lost-world-of-administrative-law/
[http://perma.cc/2WCA-MGPQ] (criticizing courts’ effort to avoid confronting role of
White House in agency rules).
187. There is no general legal directive regulating ex parte communications during
informal rulemakings, see, e.g., Esa L. Sferra-Bonistalli, Ex Parte Communications
in Informal Rulemakings 9–10 (2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Final%20Ex%20Parte%20Communications%20in%20Informal%20Rulemakin
g%20%5B5-1-14%5D_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5BK-YHWL] (“[T]he APA is decidedly
silent on any prohibition, treatment, and even the appropriateness of . . . ‘ex parte
communications’ in the informal rulemaking context.”), and the disclosure requirements
for OIRA suggestions under Section 6(a)(2) of Executive Order 12,866 are not judicially
enforceable. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994), reprinted as amended
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 802, 806 (2012) (stating nothing in Executive Order shall affect
right of judicial review).
188. See, e.g., Am. Lung Ass’n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 F.3d 388, 392–93 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (remanding rule for reconsideration because agency failed to provide reasoning for
decision); see also Meazell, supra note 30, at 748–50 (describing court’s authority to
remand cases in which agency “fails to explain itself in a reasoned manner”).
189. See, e.g., Ahlers, supra note 179, at 41–46 (documenting OIRA’s role in delaying
EPA’s ozone NAAQS standards over time).
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or it can offer a post hoc justification that it hopes the court will accept.190
Either way, the best that can be expected is the imposition of an extra
paper requirement on the agency to explain a change that it did not
make.191 The worst-case result is that this type of remand may unwittingly
encourage still more White House intervention since it can serve to delay
the implementation of rules the White House might prefer not be
promulgated in the first place.192 From the perspective of the White
House, then, the remand remedy ironically increases its power over the
agency, rather than the reverse.
C. OIRA’s Review Increases the Susceptibility of Agency Rules to Capture
Perhaps most problematic among these adverse consequences is that
invisible and unrestricted executive access to the technical details of
agency rules leaves the rules vulnerable to politically directed changes
that favor well-heeled interest groups without leaving “fingerprints.”193
For science-intensive issues that undergo elaborate deliberative pro-
cesses, this risk that the White House acts only as little more than a
“conduit” for the private sector is particularly worrisome.194
Concerns about capture animate the academic writing on OIRA
review more generally. Professors Bagley and Revesz hypothesize that—
relative to agencies—OIRA is more susceptible to public-choice drift since
190. See, e.g., McGarity, Presidential Control, supra note 58, at 461 (expressing
concern that, when agency supplies rationale post hoc for presidential intervention,
“record that the agency fabricates for appeal is a second, but entirely irrelevant, record”).
191. While in theory the agency could concede that the revised rule is unsupported or
indefensible, this frank admission seems unlikely to pass muster with OIRA, particularly if
OIRA suggested the change in the first place.
192. A remand requiring the agency to provide a more detailed explanation will lead to
delay in the final issuance of an unwanted rule without violating the legislative deadline itself.
Cf. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 570–72 (D.D.C. 1986) (condemning OMB
for holding up EPA’s rule beyond statutory deadline while allowing EPA extension to
promulgate regulations).
193. See Peter Behr, If There’s a New Rule, Jim Tozzi Has Read It, Wash. Post (July 10,
1981), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1981/07/10/if-theres-a-new-rule
-jim-tozzi-has-read-it/1554fe9b-2b1e-43fa-8b6b-6d1ae393924e/ [http://perma.cc/9GLM-
JLUL] (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting OMB official Jim Tozzi on his pre-
ference for direct conversation over time-consuming “memos, reports and other written
messages”).
194. See Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 974, 983–84 (discussing
potential for President to act as vehicle for private parties in order to get “off-the-record
views” into proceedings (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sierra Club v. Costle,
657 F.2d 298, 405 n.520 (D.C. Cir. 1981))); see also Bagley & Revesz, supra note 77, at
1305–06 (using public-choice-theory to illustrate President not “immune to public choice
pressures”); Steinzor, supra note 58, at 262–63, 267 (detailing breakdown of OIRA
meetings to reflect capture of OIRA by industry and discussing OIRA’s consistently
industry-friendly impact on rules).
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it is not only nontransparent but also largely free of judicial oversight.195
They conclude that “[i]t is frankly difficult to understand how an agency
[like OIRA] committed to operating in the shadows could be well
positioned to minimize public choice pathologies.”196 Justice Kagan
concedes that when OIRA’s review is “hidden from public scrutiny, the
President will have greater freedom to play to parochial interests.”197
Regulatory participants echo these structural worries. Interest
groups who restrict themselves to the four corners of the agency’s
administrative process report that they feel like “shmucks” when they
find out that the real game is played five blocks away, in the staff offices
of OIRA.198 EPA’s former science advisor, Paul Gilman, observes that
lobbying OIRA has become a “cottage industry” for the sophisticated
stakeholders inside the beltway.199 Former EPA Administrator, William
Reilly, admits openly to his own concerns about capture during his
tenure:
It is profoundly frustrating to an EPA Administrator to go
through all of the careful control processes of arriving at a
regulatory decision or proposal and to . . . make sure any
contact with the regulated community is recorded, noted,
memorialized, public, on the record—and then to have it go to
the White House and see many of the same parties engaged in
influencing other people who have influence over such
decisions without any public record, without any acknowledg-
ment that this is going on. The secrecy that characterized that
process, I think, is a source of great mistrust and, potentially, of
corruption. Corruption in the sense that it violates process, not
that it involves anyone taking any money.200
Scattered empirical evidence accumulating over the last three
decades reinforces the possibility that OIRA sometimes represents
195. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 77, at 1309 (observing since OIRA is not covered
by judicial review or APA, it may have “particular susceptibilities to public choice
pressures”).
196. Id. at 1310.
197. Kagan, supra note 67, at 2337.
198. Statement of Anonymous Public Interest Attorney to Wendy Wagner, Professor, Univ.
of Tex. Sch. of Law, in S.F., Cal. (Oct. 11, 2013) (discussing role of OIRA in agency rules).
199. Paul Gilman, Remarks at National Academy of Sciences Workshop: Improving the
Use of Science in the Administrative Process 100–01 (Sept. 10, 2012), http://sites
.nationalacademies.org/PGA/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_072331.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4KTT-CYQ4] (describing insufficient transparency of outside
influences on regulatory process). This is not a new role, however. A 1984 article on OMB
by Erik Olson reported, “OMB is a new focus of power in the federal bureaucracy to which
many sophisticated attorneys turn if the rulemaking agency is likely to be unreceptive.”
Olson, supra note 99, at 55. He cites former EPA General Counsel, Joan Bernstein, as
suggesting that it was legal malpractice for an industry attorney to miss this key step in the
regulatory process. Id. at 55–56.
200. Interview by Dennis Williams with William Reilly, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 1995), http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/william-k-reilly-oral-history-
interview [http://perma.cc/3MH5-7DVG].
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narrow constellations of interests that have the financial resources to
invest in this second bite at the apple.201 The danger first surfaced under
President Reagan, during which time “[t]he OMB process . . . created an
additional mechanism for the back-channel participation of industry
groups, which reinforced the review system’s antiregulatory inclina-
tions.”202 An early effort to access the documents underlying OMB’s
interventions into EPA rules in the early 1980s revealed considerable
contacts with the private sector, including the sharing of EPA rules with
industry for comment before the rules were publicly available.203
Subsequent studies reveal continued concerns about imbalanced
stakeholder engagement with OIRA. The Government Accountability
Office (GAO), for example, found in 2003 that the stakeholders that
utilized OIRA most frequently were industry representatives.204 In an
empirical examination of these same rules, David Driesen found that
OIRA’s recommended changes reduced health and environmental pro-
tections, thus favoring industry, for twenty-four of the twenty-five rules it
considered (its influence in the twenty-fifth was neutral).205 In their study
of EPA officials’ views of OIRA during the Bush I and Clinton
Administrations, Professors Bressman and Vandenbergh report that the
strong majority of those surveyed believe that the “White House readily
sought changes that would reduce burdens on regulated entities, and
veered from those that would increase such burdens.”206 Professor
Steinzor and co-authors examined the composition of stakeholder meet-
ings with OIRA and discovered that 65% of the attendees at the meetings
were industry representatives, about five times the number of public
interest groups represented.207 Similarly, Steven Croley, in his empirical
study published in 2003, found that 56% of the meetings OIRA
conducted with stakeholders to discuss rulemakings were exclusively with
industry representatives, as compared with 10% held exclusively with
201. See generally Bagley & Revesz, supra note 77, at 1305–12 (analyzing OIRA
operations through public choice theory lens).
202. Kagan, supra note 67, at 2280; see also Copeland, Role of OIRA, supra note 121,
at 1267–68 (noting shortly after President Reagan established OIRA review, “OIRA met
with representatives from dozens of businesses and associations seeking regulatory relief
and returned dozens of rules to the agencies for reconsideration”).
203. See Olson, supra note 99, at 48, 56 (noting OMB accepted and sometimes
solicited industry comments on proposed rules).
204. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-03-929, Rulemaking: OMB’s Role in
Review of Agencies’ Draft Rules and the Transparency of Those Reviews 11 (2003),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03929.pdf [http://perma.cc/5LYK-NJVJ] [hereinafter
GAO, Role in Review] (examining OIRA contact with outside parties); cf. McGarity,
Presidential Control, supra note 58, at 450 (recounting older examples of presidential
meddling in agency regulation in response to special interest pressure).
205. See Driesen, supra note 90, 400–03 (examining impact of cost–benefit analysis on
environmental regulations).
206. Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 58, at 86–87.
207. Steinzor et al., supra note 90, at 8.
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public interest groups.208 Although Professor Croley’s conclusions are
nonetheless cautiously optimistic about OIRA’s broader representation
of the public interest, he concludes that at least in some cases there is
credence for the possibility that the White House operates, in part, as an
additional “forum for interest groups who object to aspects of a rule to
enlist the White House to change it.”209
There is also evidence that these backdoor channels through OIRA
can be used by interest groups who fail to persuade the agency of their
position during the rulemaking process itself. EPA Administrator Douglas
Costle, who served under President Reagan, characterized OIRA review as
providing industry an “extra inning” for attacking EPA rules.210 Other
indicia of the profitability of using OIRA review for securing changes to a
rule are more output-oriented. In the aforementioned GAO report, eleven
of the twenty-five rules in its sample showed OIRA meeting with regulated
industry representatives, and in seven of these eleven rules OIRA adopted
the position advanced by the regulated parties—indeed in some cases
OIRA used identical language as that proffered by these parties.211
IV. A REFORMED APPROACH THAT ENHANCES THE SCIENTIFIC AND
POLITICAL INTEGRITY OF AGENCY RULES SIMULTANEOUSLY
The current incompatibility of White House review and agency
decisionmaking processes inevitably leads to the much more difficult
question of what executive oversight should consist of for these expert
agencies. In search of a better institutional design, a long line of institu-
tional architects, with Professor Strauss leading the parade, have puzzled
over how to balance two seemingly inconsistent goals for the adminis-
trative state—scientific and technical expertise on the one hand and
democratic accountability on the other.212 In other words, while decisions
need to be informed by the best information that can be obtained, they
also must respond to basic public preferences, or at least to the policy
choices advanced by their elected representatives.213
Rather than understand expert agencies and presidential control as
fundamentally in conflict, this Part concludes by proposing a reformed
institutional design that seeks to capitalize on these different perspectives
208. Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821, 853, 871 (2003).
209. Id. at 877.
210. Olson, supra note 99, at 57 n.294.
211. See GAO, Role in Review, supra note 204, at 89–90 (providing explanation of and
chart illustrating findings).
212. See Strauss, From Expertise to Politics, supra note 2, at 774–77 (discussing merits
and drawbacks of democratic involvement in rulemaking process); see also infra section
IV.A (citing this literature).
213. See Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 1451 (“[P]olitical influence must be part of the
deliberative process.”).
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by drawing them out into the open through a more visible, public
dialogue. Section IV.A presents an abstract, theory-based understanding
of how to reconcile scientific expertise with policy-based choices in
regulatory decisionmaking. In section IV.B, the discussion turns to prac-
tice and attempts to operationalize the model through particular adjust-
ments to the processes for White House review and agency deci-
sionmaking processes simultaneously. The section closes with some pre-
liminary suggestions for how this type of reformed process might be
implemented in the future.
A. Encouraging Rigorous Expertise and Political Engagement in Agency Rules
in Theory
A reformed institutional blueprint begins with Professor Strauss’s
efforts to locate a distinctive place for agencies that is at once separate
from the other three branches and at the same time inferior to and
controlled by them.214 Accordingly, and at least in theory, the agency’s
initial expert analyses should be kept distinct from the political officials’
equally valuable input into those analyses.215
By delineating the collaborators—by placing micro-experts (e.g.,
agency technical staff) in open dialogue with the macro-experts (e.g.,
White House staff)—each can contribute to the collective problem-
solving while still contending with the information and positions of the
other.216 Such juxtaposition seems more likely to spark rigorous
policymaking discussions by drawing out the different perspectives rather
than allowing them to merge their contributions in secret.217 As Colin
Scott notes, in a healthy administration, conflict and tension are not only
214. See, e.g., Strauss, The Place of Agencies, supra note 1, at 578–80 (arguing
agencies should be viewed as subordinate entities rather than distinct branch of
government); Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, supra note 3, at 983–85 (criticizing
presidential control of rules that are indistinguishable from contributions made to rules by
agencies); see also Strauss, Overseer or Decider, supra note 3, at 757 (touting indepen-
dence and unique democratic legitimacy of agencies).
215. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947) (noting agency’s experience,
appreciation of complexities and policies, and responsible treatment of facts “justif[y] the
use of the administrative process”); Frederickson et al., supra note 15, at 2 (identifying as
one of “elemental features of public administration” individual competence, “which
include[s] . . . expertise”).
216. See, e.g., Dan Wood & Richard Waterman, Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of
Bureaucracy in a Democracy 126 (1994) (observing “[i]t is healthy for bureaucracy to use
its information advantages to better inform principals on either policy matters or the
nature of the bureaucratic process”); Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State,
27 J.L. & Soc’y 38, 55 (2000) (touting importance of checks and balances in which
“opposed maximizers” hold one another in check); Strauss, From Expertise to Politics,
supra note 2, at 776–77 (gesturing towards this collaboration and suggesting, in such
settings, courts should play much more limited oversight role).
217. See, e.g., Shapiro et al., supra note 24, at 489–90 (describing various democratic the-
ories of administrative state and identifying combined independence and deliberative origins of
agency position as among most important in ensuring rulemaking has democratic grounding).
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inevitable but desirable, since “the objective should not be to iron out
conflict, but to exploit it to hold regimes in appropriate tension.”218 The
resulting enhanced discourse between diverse institutional contributors
to complex agency rules thus produces an “aggregate accountability”
whereby the entire system works well because it works productively
together.219
To those well versed in science-policy studies, a proposal to separate
expertise from policy may seem foolhardy. The National Academy’s effort
to demarcate risk assessment (the “science”) from risk management (the
“policy”) in the 1980s was largely discredited as practically impossible
given the interwoven judgments needed in assessing risk.220
Yet some independence and separation of the two forms of decision-
making is in fact possible at discrete points in the decisionmaking process,
particularly when experts amass and summarize the available evidence to
inform a larger policy question. Policymakers, for example, should
formulate the questions that technical analysts research, but the job of
assembling and evaluating the quality of the evidence bearing on the
question(s) is appropriately conducted by agency experts. Technical
analysts can also be involved in creating competing models to synthesize
the evidence, provided this work is accompanied by clear explanations of
the underlying assumptions and other framing choices made in the
development of the models.221 The result of these expert assessments is
thus not a quantitative “answer” but a rigorous summary of the available
research and alternatives.222
Even in this more limited role of the agency expert as information-
gatherer, however, there is the potential for hidden judgments to find
their way into policymaking. To protect against that risk, the agency
experts’ syntheses and models must also be subjected to rigorous public
comment and expert peer review at each step in the analysis. Consistent
with the scientific process (and in contrast to top-down political
directives), the core ingredient for this expert analysis is rigorous
218. Scott, supra note 216, at 57; see also Kitrosser, supra note 103, at 2419 (reaching
similar conclusion).
219. Scott, supra note 216, at 60 (emphasis omitted).
220. See, e.g., Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risk Assessment and Risk Management: An Uneasy
Divorce, in Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Risk Management 99, 99 (Deborah
G. Mayo & Rachelle D. Hollander eds., 1991) (discussing artificial separation and
problems it creates).
221. See, e.g., Pasky Pascual et al., Making Method Visible: Improving the Quality of
Science-Based Regulation, 2 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 429, 470–71 (2013) (arguing
agencies’ use of transparent methods of questioning allows courts to determine soundness
of their work).
222. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Policy Assessment for the Review of the
Particulate Matter National Ambient Air Quality Standards 1-15 to 1-16 (2011), http://
www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm/data/20110419pmpafinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/
FE4A-6PGU] (summarizing available data on particulate matter).
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scrutiny from diverse critics through a transparent process.223 By posi-
tioning agency career professionals as independent experts who
summarize the relevant evidence under the watchful eye of external
scientists and the public, the agency experts develop a more dispassion-
ate and grounded perspective that provides distance from the heated
political center.224 In Justice Stephen Breyer’s words, “[a] depoliticized
regulatory process [that is based in expertise, rationalization, and insu-
lation] might produce better results, hence increased confidence, lead-
ing to more favorable public and Congressional reactions.”225
This expert review of the evidence will inform but not constrain
policy choices made throughout the decisionmaking process. The
policymaker still must frame the initial question(s) that drives the expert
analysis of the evidence. The policymaker also must make the needed
policy choices at the end and throughout the decision process. Thus, if a
policy decision is selected that phases out a pollutant about which little is
known, the policymaker’s decision is set against this evidentiary record
and must be defended or criticized accordingly. Conversely, if a policy
decision is made to forgo regulatory controls on a toxic chemical, then
the policymaker’s choices must be defended against the agency expert’s
summary and synthesis of the relevant literature and data; policymakers
cannot hide behind backroom negotiations that lead to invisible changes
in model parameters or that cherry-pick only those studies that support
their preordained conclusion.226
By delineating the contributions of expert agency staff from political
staff, the level of public visibility and engagement in complicated,
science-intensive rules is elevated. Since the White House offers an
institutional perspective grounded in a type of democratic accountability
that emerges from the electoral process,227 its appropriate contribution is
to provide a larger macro-perspective on the issues rather than engage in
the technical minutiae. Moreover, if there are disagreements between the
223. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 12–16
(1996) (expanding on deliberative feature of agency processes); Wood & Waterman, supra note
216, at 145 (same).
224. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 1446 (“[P]roperly structured,
administrative law can encourage rulemaking teams to reflect many of the values and per-
spectives of the various stakeholders affected by a regulatory matter and to gain valuable
understanding from consideration of those various perspectives.”).
225. Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
55–56 (1993).
226. Thus, while an effort to insulate the experts’ review of the scientific literature
from policymaking will inevitably entail some arbitrary line-drawing, the alternative—
namely, throwing the entire science-policy decision to the winds of the political process
and abandoning any pretense of rigorous expert analysis in the agencies—is substantially
less desirable.
227. For a thoughtful discussion about what that means, see Kitrosser, supra note 103,
at 2403–05 (outlining unitary argument for presidential accountability and discussing how
number of officials and decisions complicates executive accountability).
2064 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 115:2019
agency and presidential staff on the appropriate policies, these must be
resolved without using scientific-sounding analyses as cover. Even if
presidential priorities end up carrying significant weight in the agency’s
decisionmaking process by distinguishing between expert summaries of
the evidence and policy decisions made based on that evidence, “political
influence [is not allowed to] undermine the deliberative benefits that
agency rulemaking delivers.”228
B. Encouraging Rigorous Expertise and Political Engagement in Agency Rules
in Practice
While the institutional concept of agency independence is simple,
operationalizing it is difficult since it requires instituting artificial but
inflexible firewalls between expert analysis and policymaking. Despite
these design challenges, basic scientific principles can help delineate the
expert staff’s contribution from political input, such as providing author-
ship and attribution to staff when appropriate; ensuring expert analyses
are subjected to rigorous scrutiny; and insisting on transparent and
candid explanations of the significant inputs in the analysis. EPA has, in
fact, already instituted these procedures in one of its highly regarded
regulatory processes, which is discussed later in this section. EPA’s effort
reveals that these types of formalized processes are not only possible but
can be effective in creating a more robust synthesis of the scientific
record and political considerations.
Four separate reform measures are proposed here to advance the
idealized collaboration between expertise and politics and protect
against the risk that contributions of political officials will be conflated
with the analyses of scientific staff. First, to facilitate independence, the
staff technical analyses should be memorialized in discrete reports that
are firewalled from political input unless that input is placed into the
public record. While the production of discrete reports is not essential,
reports make it easier to protect expert analyses from political influence
by identifying a limited number of staff authors during finite time
periods.229 These staff reports can also be produced at multiple stages of
the agency’s analysis, including producing a summary of the relevant
scientific and technical literature that bears on a policy question; devel-
oping risk and modeling scenarios; and identifying plausible alternative
policy options based on an analysis of the evidence.
228. Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 1451.
229. The line-drawing around technical projects will necessarily be somewhat arbitrary
given the mixed science-policy features of the agency decisions. Yet, based on EPA’s
NAAQS program, there is promising precedent for establishing these lines of separation.
See infra note 240 and accompanying text (highlighting informal firewalls used to insulate
scientific staff from political engagement). Additionally, while numerous diverse networks
make the notion of “an agency,” much less “an independent agency,” an oversimplification
or even a fiction, a focus on project outputs (e.g., technical reports) largely sidesteps these
messier features of agency operations.
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The most important feature of this particular reform measure,
however, is ensuring that all suggestions on staff scientific analyses, in-
cluding those offered by the White House and sister agencies, be treated
like ex parte communications and placed on the record rather than with-
drawn from public view by deliberative process protections.230 Agency-
expert analyses should also be firewalled from political management
within the agency itself.231 Indeed, political appointees within the agency
or from sister agencies may present greater threats to the legitimacy of
agency expertise than the White House.232
Second, even after these expert assessments of the literature and
modeling reports are completed and the agency has formulated a
proposed rule signed by its political appointee, the changes made at the
suggestion of the White House—at any point, whether during or before
formal OIRA review—should be documented consistent with the
requirements of Executive Order 12,866.233 Additionally, at least for
technical changes, the White House should provide some explanation
for its suggestions since these changes fall outside of the White House’s
presumptive area of expertise.234 This added documentation protects
against the potential for science-intensive rules to become the devil’s
playground.
230. See, e.g., Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity, supra note 42, at 1646–47
(proposing firewalls); see also Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 58, at 95–96
(stressing earlier involvement of OIRA in agency rulemakings requires transparency,
ideally implemented as docketed communications).
231. See Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity, supra note 42, at 1634–35
(offering recommendation with respect to proceduralizing role of appointees); see also
Steinzor, supra note 58, at 264–65 (providing example of added influence of affected
agencies in EPA’s coal ash rule).
232. Thus, rather than draw lines between the agency and the White House for
heightened transparency and accountability, as required by Executive Order 12,866, see
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 640–41 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
app. at 802, 803 (2012), the lines recommended here are drawn within the agency between
career and political staff, albeit only with respect to preparation of discrete but necessary
technical assessments that inform decisionmaking. Cf. Strauss, Possible Controls, supra note
2, at 135–39 (considering strict separation between career and political staff in abstract—and
presumably with respect to more than just transparency requirements—but expressing
doubts separation will actually draw accurate line between politics and science).
233. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 644–46, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 802, 804–05 (describing reporting requirements for significant agency actions);
see also Mendelson, supra note 8 (arguing for heightened transparency of OIRA’s changes);
Strauss, Possible Controls, supra note 2, at 151–53 (insisting on transparency as prerequisite
for White House influence). While the Executive Order’s reporting requirements have been
interpreted by OIRA to require transparency only during its review process, the underlying
conception of demarcating OIRA’s contribution (as well as the ambiguous language) favors
an interpretation that expects transparency for any significant suggestion made by OIRA at
any point in the rulemaking process.
234. In addition, rather than waiting until the rule is published, these changes should
be made part of the administrative record immediately so that they can be considered by
commenters and peer reviewers in critiquing the proposed rule and deciding whether to
file an appeal.
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Third, consistent with the literature on expert public administration, a
quid pro quo for insulating staff analyses from undisclosed political
influence is a requirement that agencies’ technical analyses be subjected to
rigorous public and scientific comment and review. Although some agencies
already deploy this deliberative engagement in their science-intensive
decisionmaking, for the remaining agencies, this recommendation will
entail the extra step of documenting the evidentiary basis upon which the
proposed rule or other policy is based, ideally at a point before a proposed
rule is issued.235
Fourth and finally, while agency expertise would enjoy heightened
independence, at the same time the agency should be required to
actively solicit input from the political branches at each key step in the
decisionmaking process, particularly at the initial framing and priori-
tization stages, as well as at the end in selecting the best alternative. This
will help ensure that the macro-level policymakers truly do engage with
the micro-level agency experts.236 The need for earlier dialogue between
the White House and agencies has been highlighted by institutional
architects like Professor Strauss237 and reinforced in more focused studies
of agency–OIRA relationships. Professor Nou, for example, suggests that
some of the existing agency self-insulation against presidential review
may be more a function of this late timing of OIRA review than anything
else.238 EPA respondents in a Bressman and Vandenbergh study similarly
identify the need for earlier—but transparent—OIRA involvement as a
feature of a reformed institutional approach.239 And while the current
method of presidential engagement and OIRA oversight is not structured
in a way to make this early input routine or perhaps even feasible,
considerable staff resources in OIRA will become available if OIRA’s
elaborate technical editing of agency rules is reduced or even curtailed.
Although each of these changes may seem idealistic, EPA has already
implemented most of them in setting ambient air quality standards. EPA
institutes informal firewalls that seek to keep political engagement,
including appointees within the agency, at arm’s length from the scien-
235. See, e.g., Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 61–63 (discussing absence of
initial technical analysis at FWS in implementing Endangered Species Act).
236. But see Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 1443–44 (recommending only end-of-the-
rule White House review to avoid ends-oriented pressure on agency staff).
237. See, e.g., Strauss, Possible Controls, supra note 2, at 149–50 (discussing benefits
of greater White House involvement in agency priority-setting). Such engagement will
require more resources and time, which may make it impracticable in some cases.
238. See Nou, supra note 48, at 1796–98 (discussing agency use of timing strategies to
avoid rule reversal).
239. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 58, at 95–96 (noting EPA respondents
“commented that OIRA review occurs too late in the rule-making process”). Professors
Farber and O’Connell also champion this earlier, transparent engagement of OIRA in
agency rules. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 8, at 1184.
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tific staff in their preparation of technical reports.240 EPA subjects the
staff analyses that form the evidentiary backdrop for its proposed
ambient air quality standards to multiple rounds of both public and
scientific review, again all on the record.241 And, with respect to soliciting
policy engagement, EPA convenes a scoping session at the initiation of
each rulemaking process that engages all groups, presumably including
sister agencies and the White House, in framing the relevant questions
for the scientific analysis supporting the possible revision of air quality
standards.242 Indeed, the only reform proposal that is not already firmly
established in EPA’s approach is strict compliance with the transparency
requirements of section 6 of Executive Order 12,866 with respect to
documenting OIRA’s suggestions to agency rules.243
Beyond producing a more vigorous institutional dialogue, this
reformed process promises valuable secondary benefits.244 First and most
significantly, it helps protect against capture by placing political and
interagency comments on the record and forcing these officials to identify
the macro-policy concerns that motivate their various comments.245 The
reforms also make the issues at stake in a given ruling more accessible and
concrete to the public, in part by encouraging full explanations for choices
made in the rule, including those advanced by the White House, and in
part by providing an added check on the agency’s analyses. Finally, by
engaging OIRA earlier, the agency’s analysis is less likely to be derailed
later in the process; macro-policy preferences will be on the table at the
outset of the rulemaking lifecycle.
With the theory and preliminary blueprint on the table, the final set
of challenges involves overcoming the multiple disincentives to
implementation. The most obvious problem—apparent from the drift of
OIRA into the technical features of rules and its stubborn lack of
transparency over the last twenty years—is the President’s own self-
interest in engaging in this type of technical meddling without corre-
sponding public accountability. And, while the agencies do have
countervailing incentives to raise the visibility of OIRA’s changes, they
generally lack both the power and stamina to resist political pressure over
the long term.
In the abstract, repositioning OIRA as an agency committed to
ensuring that agency decision processes are scientifically rigorous—rather
than engaging in the substantive technical details of individual rules—
seems a more appropriate and cost-effective role for this White House
240. See, e.g., Wagner, ACUS Report, supra note 24, at 36, 39–40 (discussing this
informal practice).
241. See, e.g., id. at 38 (noting extensive deliberative steps in NAAQS analysis).
242. See, e.g., id. at 32 (describing scoping session).
243. See, e.g., id. at 78 (documenting some noncompliance with section 6(a)(2) of
Executive Order by EPA in setting NAAQS standards).
244. See Mendelson, supra note 8, at 1163–66 (cataloging these advantages).
245. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 58, at 91 (making this point).
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office committed to regulatory and informational excellence. Given the
historical roles of both the President and OIRA with respect to agency
rules, however, it may be the case that reinventing OIRA will demand
outside intervention.
Congress could enact direct reform through an amendment to the
APA that requires documentation of all political comments and
deliberations over agency-expert scientific reports or memoranda,
treating these communications essentially as ex parte contact.246 Alter-
natively, Congress could establish a scientific integrity office that invest-
igates and reports on staff complaints of controversial interventions
between political management and scientific staff analysts, particularly at
early stages of the rulemakings.247
The courts could also be enlisted through reform legislation to
police these added procedural requirements. Even without legislation,
however, the courts should continue to resist providing agency expertise
extreme deference if there is not some evidence of independence in the
development of the expert assessment and an accompanying rationale
for the significant and contested technical choices made in agency
rules.248 To the extent that interventions from OIRA or the White House
appear to be the culprit for an agency’s incoherence in explaining its
scientific choices, moreover, the court could note that fact in order to
raise it to public view.249
CONCLUSION
As Professor Strauss has noted, “finding appropriate space both for
the understandings science can bring and for the expression of
democratic concerns [in rulemakings] is challenging indeed.”250 Yet
thanks to his pioneering work, we can conceptualize a reformed process.
246. Congressional focus on OIRA technical changes is particularly likely to fall safely
within Congress’s powers to regulate executive functions. See, e.g., William D. Araiza,
Judicial and Legislative Checks on Ex Parte OMB Influence over Rulemaking, 54 Admin.
L. Rev. 611, 627 (2002) (reaching this conclusion).
247. Professors Farber and O’Connell likewise suggest that Congress could task GAO
with conducting more regular investigations of White House engagement in agency rules,
including, for example, targeted investigations of political intervention into agency staff
analyses. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 8, at 1182 (suggesting tasking GAO with
investigations of regulatory review process).
248. Id. at 1186 (making this suggestion); Olson, supra note 99, at 77 (same);
Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 1457 (same).
249. In Mississippi v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 744 F.3d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the court did
reverse and remand one of EPA’s secondary standards for lack of support in the record,
but the court never mentioned OIRA’s role in creating that standard, a feature which was
in fact noted in the petitioner’s brief. See Final Opening Brief of State Petitioners at 32
n.24, Mississippi v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 744 F.3d 1334 (No. 08-1200) (noting Administrator
did not expressly rely on OMB). The court thus missed an opportunity to increase the
visibility and costs of White House review with respect to science-intensive rulemakings.
250. Strauss, Possible Controls, supra note 2, at 151.
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Both the President’s OIRA and the agencies can be forced to reconcile
their distinct perspectives in a public dialogue. The White House will
serve as the protagonist for ensuring that macro-considerations
imbedded deep within the agencies’ technical and science-intensive rules
are exposed to public scrutiny, while the agency will have the institutional
space to maximize the scientific integrity of its rulemaking process
without overt political influence. Reforming White House review in this
way does not necessitate a radical change in institutional design—it
requires only some political self-restraint from the offices of the
President and possibly modest legislative reinforcement from Congress.
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